




European Securities and
Markets Authority

Reply form for the ESMA MiFID II/MiFIR Discussion Paper





European Securities and
Markets Authority

Date: 22 May 2014



Responding to this paper

The European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) invites responses to the specific questions listed in the ESMA MiFID II/MiFIR Discussion Paper, published on the ESMA website ([here](#)).

Instructions

Please note that, in order to facilitate the analysis of the large number of responses expected, you are requested to use this file to send your response to ESMA so as to allow us to process it properly. Therefore, please follow the instructions described below:

- i. use this form and send your responses in Word format;
- ii. do not remove the tags of type <ESMA_QUESTION_1> - i.e. the response to one question has to be framed by the 2 tags corresponding to the question; and
- iii. if you do not have a response to a question, do not delete it and leave the text "TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE" between the tags.

Responses are most helpful:

- i. if they respond to the question stated;
- ii. contain a clear rationale, including on any related costs and benefits; and
- iii. describe any alternatives that ESMA should consider

Given the breadth of issues covered, ESMA expects and encourages respondents to specially answer those questions relevant to their business, interest and experience.

To help you navigate this document more easily, bookmarks are available in "Navigation Pane" for Word 2010 and in "Document Map" for Word 2007.

Responses must reach us by **1 August 2014**.

All contributions should be submitted online at www.esma.europa.eu under the heading 'Your input/Consultations'.

Publication of responses

All contributions received will be published following the end of the consultation period, unless otherwise requested. **Please clearly indicate by ticking the appropriate checkbox in the website submission form if you do not wish your contribution to be publicly disclosed. A standard confidentiality statement in an email message will not be treated as a request for non-disclosure.** Note also that a confidential response may be requested from us in accordance with ESMA's rules on access to documents. We may consult you if we receive such a request. Any decision we make is reviewable by ESMA's Board of Appeal and the European Ombudsman.

Data protection

Information on data protection can be found at www.esma.europa.eu under the heading 'Disclaimer'.



1. Overview

2. Investor protection

2.1. Authorisation of investment firms

Q1: Do you agree that the existing work/standards set out in points Fehler! Verweisquelle konnte nicht gefunden werden. and Fehler! Verweisquelle konnte nicht gefunden werden. Fehler! Verweisquelle konnte nicht gefunden werden. provide a valid basis on which to develop implementing measures in respect of the authorisation of investment firms?

<ESMA_QUESTION_1>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_1>

Q2: What areas of these existing standards do you consider require adjustment, and in what way should they be adjusted?

<ESMA_QUESTION_2>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_2>

Q3: Do you consider that the list of information set out in point Fehler! Verweisquelle konnte nicht gefunden werden. should be provided to Home State NCAs? If not, what other information should ESMA consider?

<ESMA_QUESTION_3>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_3>

Q4: Are there any other elements which may help to assess whether the main activities of an applicant investment firm is not in the territory where the application is made?

<ESMA_QUESTION_4>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_4>

Q5: How much would one-off costs incurred during the authorisation process increase, compared to current practices, in order to meet the requirements suggested in this section?

<ESMA_QUESTION_5>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_5>

Q6: Are there any particular items of information suggested above that would take significant time or cost to produce and if so, do you have alternative suggestions that would reduce the time/cost for firms yet provide the same assurance to NCAs?

<ESMA_QUESTION_6>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_6>



2.2. Freedom to provide investment services and activities / Establishment of a branch

Q7: Do you agree that development of technical standards required under Articles 34 and 35 of MiFID II should be based on the existing standards and forms contained in the CESR Protocol on MiFID Notifications (CESR/07-317c)? If not, what are the specific areas in the existing CESR standards requiring review and adjustment?

<ESMA_QUESTION_7>
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<ESMA_QUESTION_7>

2.3. Best execution - publication of data related to the quality of execution by trading venues for each financial instrument traded

Q8: Do you agree data should be provided by all the execution venues as set out in footnote 24? If not, please state why not.

<ESMA_QUESTION_8>
Bundesverband der Wertpapierfirmen (bwf) comment:

While we agree in general that data should be provided by all execution venues, it must be stated clearly that „market makers“, as well as “systematic internalisers”, do not fall under the conclusive list of “trading venues” stipulated in Article 4(24) MiFID II. Accordingly, the provisions of Article 27(3) MiFID II which are exclusively addressed to trading venues does neither apply to „market makers“ nor “systematic internalisers” and ESMA has no authority to extent the scope of the Level I text.

However, while the obligation to publish data related to the quality of execution applies to trading venues only, we would not object that trading venues operating different market models and thus different order books for a specific financial instrument (e.g. one open limit order book and another for a “hybrid” market model with market maker support) would be required to be published data separately for different market models.

<ESMA_QUESTION_8>

Q9: If you think that the different types of venues should not publish exactly the same data, please specify how the data should be adapted in each case, and the reasons for each adjustment.

<ESMA_QUESTION_9>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_9>

Q10: Should the data publication obligation apply to every financial instrument traded on the execution venue? Alternatively, should there be a minimum threshold of activity and, if so, how should it be defined (for example, frequency of trades, number of trades, turnover etc.)?

<ESMA_QUESTION_10>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_10>



Q11: How often should all execution data be published by trading venues? Is the minimum requirement specified in MiFID II sufficient, or should this frequency be increased? Is it reasonable or beneficial to require publication on a monthly basis and is it possible to reliably estimate the marginal cost of increased frequency?

<ESMA_QUESTION_11>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_11>

Q12: Please provide an estimate of the cost of the necessary IT development for the production and the publication of such reporting.

<ESMA_QUESTION_12>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_12>

Q13: Do you agree that trading venues should publish the data relating to the quality of execution with regard to a uniform reference period, with a minimum of specific reporting details and in a compatible format of data based on a homogeneous calculation method? If not, please state why.

<ESMA_QUESTION_13>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_13>

Q14: Is the volume of orders received and executed a good indicator for investment firms to compare execution venues? Would the VBBO in a single stock published at the same time also be a good indicator by facilitating the creation of a periodic European price benchmark? Are there other indicators to be considered?

<ESMA_QUESTION_14>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_14>

Q15: The venue execution quality reporting obligation is intended to apply to all MiFID instruments. Is this feasible and what differences in approach will be required for different instrument types?

<ESMA_QUESTION_15>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_15>

Q16: Do you consider that this requirement will generate any additional cost? If yes, could you specify in which areas and provide an estimation of these costs?

<ESMA_QUESTION_16>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_16>

Q17: If available liquidity and execution quality are a function of order size, is it appropriate to split trades into ranges so that they are comparable? How should they be defined (for example, as a percentage of the average trading size of the financial instrument on the execution venue; fixed ranges by volume or value; or in another manner)?

<ESMA_QUESTION_17>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_17>



Q18: Do you agree that a benchmark price is needed to evaluate execution quality? Would a depth-weighted benchmark that relates in size to the executed order be appropriate or, if not, could you provide alternative suggestions together with justification?

<ESMA_QUESTION_18>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_18>

Q19: What kind of cost should be reported (e.g. regulatory levies, taxes, mandatory clearing fees) and how should this data be presented to enable recipients to assess the total consideration of transactions?

<ESMA_QUESTION_19>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_19>

Q20: What would be the most appropriate way to measure the likelihood of execution in order to get useful data? Would it be a good indicator for likelihood of execution to measure the percentage of orders not executed at the end of the applicable trading period (for example the end of each trading day)? Should the modification of an order be taken into consideration?

<ESMA_QUESTION_20>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_20>

Q21: What would be the most appropriate way to measure the speed of execution in order to get useful data?

<ESMA_QUESTION_21>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_21>

Q22: Are there other criteria (qualitative or quantitative) that are particularly relevant (e.g. market structures providing for a guarantee of settlement of the trades vs OTC deals; robustness of the market infrastructure due to the existence of circuit breakers)?

<ESMA_QUESTION_22>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_22>

Q23: Is data on orders cancelled useful and if so, on what time basis should it be computed (e.g. within a single trading day)?

<ESMA_QUESTION_23>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_23>

Q24: Are there any adjustments that need to be made to the above execution quality metrics to accommodate different market microstructures?

<ESMA_QUESTION_24>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_24>

Q25: What additional measures are required to define or capture the above data and relevant additional information (e.g. depth weighted spreads, book depths, or others) How should the data be presented: on an average basis such as daily, weekly or monthly for each financial instrument (or on more than one basis)? Do you think that the metrics captured in the Annex to this chapter are relevant to European markets trading in the full range of MiFID instruments? What alternative could you propose?

<ESMA_QUESTION_25>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_25>

Q26: Please provide an estimate of the costs of production and publication of all of the above data and, the IT developments required? How could these costs be minimised?

<ESMA_QUESTION_26>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_26>

Q27: Would increasing the frequency of venue execution quality data generate additional costs for you? Would these costs arise as a result of an increase of the frequency of the review, or because this review will require additional training for your staff in order to be able to analyse and take into account these data? Please provide an estimate of these costs.

<ESMA_QUESTION_27>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_27>

Q28: Do you agree that investment firms should take the publication of the data envisaged in this Discussion Paper into consideration, in order to determine whether they represent a “material change”?

<ESMA_QUESTION_28>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_28>

2.4. Best execution - publication of data by investment firms

Q29: Do you agree that in order to allow clients to evaluate the quality of a firm’s execution, any proposed standards should oblige the firm to give an appropriate picture of the venues and the different ways they execute an order?

<ESMA_QUESTION_29>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_29>

Q30: Do you agree that when systematic internalisers, market makers, OTC negotiation or dealing on own account represent one of the five most important ways for the firm to execute clients’ orders, they should be incorporated in the reporting obligations under Article 27(6) of MiFID II?

<ESMA_QUESTION_30>
Bundesverband der Wertpapierfirmen (bwf) comment:

We clearly disagree with ESMA’s proposal to treat systematic internalisers, market makers, OTC negotiation and own account trading as “trading venues” for the purpose of Article 27(6) MiFID II. As al-



ready mentioned in our answer to question 8 DP, Article 4(24) MiFID II provides a conclusive list of “trading venues” under MiFID II which ESMA is not allowed to alter at its own discretion.

However, where a trading venue operates different market models, it could be deemed appropriate and in line with MiFID II objectives that an investment firm further specifies and breaks down which market model on a given venue it has used to which extend.

<ESMA_QUESTION_30>

Q31: Do you think that the data provided should be different in cases when the firm directly executes the orders to when the firm transmits the orders to a third-party for execution? If yes, please indicate what the differences should be, and explain why.

<ESMA_QUESTION_31>

TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE

<ESMA_QUESTION_31>

Q32: Do you consider that information on both directed and non-directed orders is useful? Should the data be aggregated so that both types of order are shown together or separated? Should there be a similar approach to disclosure of information on market orders versus limit orders? Do you think that another categorisation of client orders could be useful?

<ESMA_QUESTION_32>

Bundesverband der Wertpapierfirmen (bvf) comment:

Even though, there seems to be some ambiguity in the Level I text, we are of the opinion that the purpose of Article 27(6) MiFID II is to provide clients of an investment firm with empirical evidence how the firm’s best execution policy works in practice. We therefore consider it to be appropriate that only the execution of orders whereby the investment firm did select the trading venue (non directed orders) should be included.

Since we are not aware on any significant differentiation in the routing practice of market and limit orders, we are of the opinion that all non directed orders should be considered in aggregate.

E<ESMA_QUESTION_32>

Q33: Do you think that the reporting data should separate retail clients from other types of clients? Do you think that this data should be publicly disclosed or only provided to the NCA (e.g. when requested to assess whether there is unfair discrimination between retail clients and other categories)? Is there a more useful way to categorise clients for these purposes?

<ESMA_QUESTION_33>

Bundesverband der Wertpapierfirmen (bvf) comment:

While best execution requirements for retail- and professional clients are not exactly the same, we are not convinced that any practical differences would be meaningful enough to justify a differentiated view at this point.

<ESMA_QUESTION_33>

Q34: Do you agree that the investment firms should publish the data relating to their execution of orders with regard to a uniform reference period, with a minimum of specific reporting details and in a compatible format of data based on a homogeneous calculation method? If not, please state why.

<ESMA_QUESTION_34>

Bundesverband der Wertpapierfirmen (bvf) comment:

While we agree that investment firms should be obliged to use a harmonized reference period which we think should be one year in accordance with the minimum reporting frequency, we are less convinced by



ESMA's proposal that all firms should be obliged to use the civil year as a uniform time frame. In fact, we would not expect any notable disadvantages for investors, if firms would be given the flexibility to use its business years instead, in cases where this departs from the civil year.

<ESMA_QUESTION_34>

Q35: What would be an acceptable delay for publication to provide the clients with useful data?

<ESMA_QUESTION_35>

TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE

<ESMA_QUESTION_35>

Q36: What format should the report take? Should there be any difference depending on the nature of the execution venues (MTF, OTF, Regulated Market, systematic internalisers, own account) and, if so, could you specify the precise data required for each type?

<ESMA_QUESTION_36>

TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE

<ESMA_QUESTION_36>

Q37: Do you agree that it is proportionate to require investment firms to publish on an annual basis a summary based on their internal execution quality monitoring of their top five execution venues in terms of trading volumes, subject to certain minimum standards?

<ESMA_QUESTION_37>

TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE

<ESMA_QUESTION_37>

Q38: Do you have views on how 'directed orders' covered by client specific instructions should be captured in the information on execution quality? Is it possible to disaggregate reporting for directed orders from those for which there are no specific instructions and, if so, what the most relevant criteria would be for this exercise?

<ESMA_QUESTION_38>

TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE

<ESMA_QUESTION_38>

Q39: Minimum standards to ensure that the summary of the firm's internal execution quality monitoring of their top five execution venues (in terms of trading volumes) is comprehensive and contains sufficient analysis or context to allow it to be understood by market participants shall include the factors set out at paragraph 29. Do you agree with this analysis or are there any other relevant factors that should be considered as minimum standards for reporting?

<ESMA_QUESTION_39>

TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE

<ESMA_QUESTION_39>

Q40: Can you recommend an alternative approach to the provision of information on execution quality obtained by investment firms, which is consistent with Article 27(6) of MiFID II and with ESMA's overall objective to ensure proportionate implementation?

<ESMA_QUESTION_40>

TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE

<ESMA_QUESTION_40>



Q41: Do you agree that ESMA should try to limit the number of definitions of classes of instruments and provide a classification that can be used for the different reports established by MiFID and MiFIR?

<ESMA_QUESTION_41>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_41>

Q42: If this approach is not viable how should these classes be defined? What elements should be taken into consideration for that classification? Please explain the rationale of your classification. Is there a need to delay the publication of the reporting for particular class of financial instruments? If the schedule has to be defined, what timeframe would be the most relevant?

<ESMA_QUESTION_42>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_42>

Q43: Is any additional data required (for instance, on number of trades or total value of orders routed)?

<ESMA_QUESTION_43>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_43>

Q44: What information on conflicts of interest would be appropriate (inducements, capital links, payment for order flow, etc.)?

<ESMA_QUESTION_44>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_44>



3. Transparency

3.1. Pre-trade transparency - Equities

Q45: What in your view would be the minimum content of information that would make an indication of interest actionable? Please provide arguments with your answer.

<ESMA_QUESTION_45>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_45>

Q46: Do you agree with ESMA's opinion that Table 1 of Annex II of Regulation 1287/2006 is still valid for shares traded on regulated markets and MTFs? Please provide reasons for your answer.

<ESMA_QUESTION_46>
Bundesverband der Wertpapierfirmen (bwf) comment:

We fully agree with ESMA's opinion Table 1 of Annex II of Regulation 1287/2006 is still valid for shares traded on regulated markets and MTFs. For more detail with respect to the ongoing relevance of "hybrid systems" please refer to our answers to questions 186 & 281 DP.

<ESMA_QUESTION_46>

Q47: Do you agree with ESMA's view that Table 1 of Annex II of Regulation 1287/2006 is appropriate for equity-like instruments traded on regulated markets and MTFs? Are there other trading systems ESMA should take into account for these instruments? Please provide reasons for your answer.

<ESMA_QUESTION_47>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_47>

Q48: Do you agree with ESMA's view that ADT remains a valid measure for determining when an order is large in scale compared to normal market size? If not, what other measure would you suggest as a substitute or complement to the ADT? Please provide reasons for your answer.

<ESMA_QUESTION_48>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_48>

Q49: Do you agree that ADT should be used as an indicator also for the MiFIR equity-like products (depository receipts, ETFs and certificates)? Please provide reasons for your answers.

<ESMA_QUESTION_49>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_49>



Q50: Do you think there is merit in creating a new ADT class of 0 to €100,000 with an adequate new large in scale threshold and a new ADT class of €100,000 to €500,000? At what level should the thresholds be set? Please provide reasons for your answer.

<ESMA_QUESTION_50>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_50>

Q51: Do you think there is merit in creating new ADT classes of €1 to €5m and €5 to €25m? At what level should the thresholds be set? Please provide reasons for your answer.

<ESMA_QUESTION_51>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_51>

Q52: Do you think there is merit in creating a new ADT class for 'super-liquid' shares with an ADT in excess of €100m and a new class of €50m to €100m? At what level should the thresholds be set?

<ESMA_QUESTION_52>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_52>

Q53: What comments do you have in respect of the new large in scale transparency thresholds for shares proposed by ESMA?

<ESMA_QUESTION_53>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_53>

Q54: Do you agree with the ADT ranges selected? Do you agree with the large in scale thresholds set for each ADT class? Which is your preferred option? Would you calibrate the ADT classes and related large in scale thresholds differently? Please provide reasons for your answers, including describing your own role in the market (e.g. market-maker, issuer etc).

<ESMA_QUESTION_54>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_54>

Q55: Which is your preferred scenario? Would you calibrate the ADT classes differently? Please provide reasons for your answers.

<ESMA_QUESTION_55>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_55>

Q56: Do you agree that the same ADT classes should be used for both pre-trade and post-trade transparency? Please provide reasons for your answers.

<ESMA_QUESTION_56>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_56>

Q57: How would you calibrate the large in scale thresholds for each ADT class for pre- and post-trade transparency? Please provide reasons for your answers.



<ESMA_QUESTION_57>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_57>

Q58: Do you agree with ESMA's view that the large in scale thresholds (i.e. the minimum size of orders qualifying as large in scale and the ADT classes) should be subject to a review no earlier than two years after MiFIR and Level 2 apply in practice?

<ESMA_QUESTION_58>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_58>

Q59: How frequently do you think the calculation per financial instrument should be performed to determine within which large in scale class it falls? Which combination of frequency and period would you recommend?

<ESMA_QUESTION_59>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_59>

Q60: Do you agree with ESMA's opinion that stubs should become transparent once they are a certain percentage below the large in scale thresholds? If yes, at what percentage would you set the transparency threshold for large in scale stubs? Please provide reasons to support your answer.

<ESMA_QUESTION_60>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_60>

Q61: Do you agree with ESMA's view that the most relevant market in terms of liquidity should be the trading venue with the highest turnover in the relevant financial instrument? Do you agree with an annual review of the most relevant market in terms of liquidity? Please give reasons for your answer.

<ESMA_QUESTION_61>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_61>

Q62: Do you agree with ESMA's view on the different ways the member or participant of a trading venue can execute a negotiated trade? Please give reasons for your answer.

<ESMA_QUESTION_62>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_62>

Q63: Do you agree that the proposed list of transactions are subject to conditions other than the current market price and do not contribute to the price formation process? Do you think that there are other transactions which are subject to conditions other than the current market price that should be added to the list? Please provide reasons for your answer.

<ESMA_QUESTION_63>
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<ESMA_QUESTION_63>



Q64: Do you agree that these are the two main groups of order management facilities ESMA should focus on or are there others?

<ESMA_QUESTION_64>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_64>

Q65: Do you agree with ESMA's general assessment on how to design future implementing measures for the order management facility waiver? Please provide reasons for your answer.

<ESMA_QUESTION_65>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_65>

Q66: Are there other factors that need to be taken into consideration for equity-like instruments? Please provide reasons for your answer.

<ESMA_QUESTION_66>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_66>

Q67: Do you agree that the minimum size for a stop order should be set at the minimum tradable quantity of shares in the relevant trading venue? Please provide reasons for your answer.

<ESMA_QUESTION_67>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_67>

Q68: Are there additional factors that need to be taken into consideration for equity-like instruments?

<ESMA_QUESTION_68>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_68>

Q69: Which minimum overall sizes for iceberg orders are currently employed in the markets you use and how are those minimum sizes determined?

<ESMA_QUESTION_69>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_69>

Q70: Which minimum sizes and which methods for determining them should be prescribed via implementing measures? To what level of detail should such an implementing measure go and what should be left to the discretion of the individual market to attain an appropriate level of harmonisation?

<ESMA_QUESTION_70>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_70>

Q71: Which methods for determining the individual peak sizes of iceberg orders are currently employed in European markets?

<ESMA_QUESTION_71>



TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_71>

Q72: Which methods for determining peaks should be prescribed by implementing measures, for example, should these be purely abstract criteria or a measure expressed in percentages against the overall size of the iceberg order? To what level of details should such an implementing measure go and what should be left to the discretion of the individual market to attain an appropriate level of harmonisation?

<ESMA_QUESTION_72>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_72>

Q73: Are there additional factors that need to be taken into consideration for equity-like instruments?

<ESMA_QUESTION_73>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_73>

3.2. Post-trade transparency - Equities

Q74: Do you agree that the content of the information currently required under existing MiFID is still valid for shares and applicable to equity-like instruments? Please provide reasons for your answer.

<ESMA_QUESTION_74>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_74>

Q75: Do you think that any new field(s) should be considered? If yes, which other information should be disclosed?

<ESMA_QUESTION_75>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_75>

Q76: Do you think that the current post-trade regime should be retained or that the identity of the systematic internaliser is relevant information which should be published? Please provide reasons for your response, distinguishing between liquid shares and illiquid shares.

<ESMA_QUESTION_76>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_76>

Q77: Do you agree with the proposed list of identifiers? Please provide reasons for your answer.

<ESMA_QUESTION_77>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_77>



Q78: Do you think that specific flags for equity-like instruments should be envisaged? Please justify your answer.

<ESMA_QUESTION_78>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_78>

Q79: Do you support the proposal to introduce a flag for trades that benefit from the large in scale deferral? Please provide reasons for your response.

<ESMA_QUESTION_79>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_79>

Q80: What is your view on requiring post-trade reports to identify the market mechanism, the trading mode and the publication mode in addition to the flags for the different types of transactions proposed in the table above? Please provide reasons for your answer.

<ESMA_QUESTION_80>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_80>

Q81: For which transactions captured by Article 20(1) would you consider specifying additional flags as foreseen by Article 20(3)(b) as useful?

<ESMA_QUESTION_81>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_81>

Q82: Do you agree with the definition of “normal trading hours” given above?

<ESMA_QUESTION_82>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_82>

Q83: Do you agree with the proposed shortening of the maximum permissible delay to 1 minute? Do you see any reason to have a different maximum permissible deferral of publication for any equity-like instrument? Please provide reasons for your answer

<ESMA_QUESTION_83>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_83>

Q84: Should the deferred publication regime be subject to the condition that the transaction is between an investment firm dealing on own account and a client of the firm? Please provide reasons for your answer.

<ESMA_QUESTION_84>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_84>

Q85: Which of the two options do you prefer in relation to the deferral periods for large in scale transactions (or do you prefer another option that has not been proposed)? Please provide reasons for your answer

<ESMA_QUESTION_85>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE



<ESMA_QUESTION_85>

Q86: Do you see merit in adding more ADT classes and adjusting the large in scale thresholds as proposed? Please provide alternatives if you disagree with ESMA's proposal

<ESMA_QUESTION_86>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_86>

Q87: Do you consider the thresholds proposed as appropriate for SME shares?

<ESMA_QUESTION_87>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_87>

Q88: How frequently should the large in scale table be reviewed? Please provide reasons for your answer

<ESMA_QUESTION_88>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_88>

Q89: Do you have concerns regarding deferred publication occurring at the end of the trading day, during the closing auction period?

<ESMA_QUESTION_89>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_89>

Q90: Do you agree with ESMA's preliminary view of applying the same ADT classes to the pre-trade and post-trade transparency regimes for ETFs? Please provide reasons for your answer.

<ESMA_QUESTION_90>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_90>

3.3. Systematic Internaliser Regime - Equities

Q91: Do you support maintaining the existing definition of quotes reflecting prevailing market conditions? Please provide reasons for your answer.

<ESMA_QUESTION_91>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_91>

Q92: Do you support maintaining the existing table for the calculation of the standard market size? If not, which of the above options do you believe provides the best trade-off between maintaining a sufficient level of transparency and ensuring that obligations for systematic internalisers remain reasonable and proportionate? Please provide reasons for your answer.

<ESMA_QUESTION_92>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_92>

Q93: Do you agree with the proposal to set the standard market size for depositary receipts at the same level as for shares? Please provide reasons for your answer.

<ESMA_QUESTION_93>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_93>

Q94: What are your views regarding how financial instruments should be grouped into classes and/or how the standard market size for each class should be established for certificates and exchange traded funds?

<ESMA_QUESTION_94>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_94>

3.4. Trading obligation for shares (Article 23, MiFIR)

Q95: Do you consider that the determination of what is non-systematic, ad-hoc, irregular and infrequent should be defined within the same parameters applicable for the systematic internaliser definition? In the case of the exemption to the trading obligation for shares, should the frequency concept be more restrictive taking into consideration the other factors, i.e. 'ad-hoc' and 'irregular'?

<ESMA_QUESTION_95>
Bundesverband der Wertpapierfirmen (bwf) comment:

For the sake of clarity and uniformity of provisions, we agree in principle that the determination of "non-systemic, ad-hoc, irregular and infrequent" should be harmonised across different MiFID II / MiFIR provisions.

Article 23 Paragraph 1(1) stipulates two different sets of exemption (a) & (b) which are very different in nature and should not be mixed up. Even more since Article 23 Paragraph 1(1)(b) may cover trades which occur on a regular basis. In fact, all types of trades enclosed in ESMA's list of examples presented in its proposal in Paragraph 13 of Chapter 3.4. DP might be concluded on a regular and frequent basis (depending on a firms' business model).

<ESMA_QUESTION_95>

Q96: Do you agree with the list of examples of trades that do not contribute to the price discovery process? In case of an exhaustive list_would you add any other type of transaction? Would you exclude any of them? Please, provide reasons for your response.

<ESMA_QUESTION_96>
Bundesverband der Wertpapierfirmen (bwf) comment:

We agree in principle with the list of examples in so far as all examples are relevant but we are not in favour of this list being exhaustive. However, ESMA has not acknowledged so far that certain types of trades may fall under both categories "non addressable liquidity" and "factors other than the current market valuation of the financial instrument". In fact, all examples presented under the "factors other than the current market valuation of the financial instrument" category can be reasonably expected to represent "non addressable liquidity" at the same time.

We further disagree with the assumption that portfolio trades necessarily are priced against a specific reference price. This might be the case where the "portfolio" or "basket" composition is composed in a way that it in full or approximately reflects a specific benchmark or index. However, this is not necessar-



ily the case. Therefore the term “against a specific reference price” should be deleted. Even more since no indication can be found in the Level I text which would call for such a requirement.

With respect to “benchmark trades” (e.g. VWAP orders), ESMA assumes correctly that the “second limb” of the transaction whereby an investment firms “transfers the ownership of the previously executed orders in one single trade at the benchmark price” should be considered to fall into the category of trades “where the exchange of financial instruments is determined by factors other than the current market valuation of the financial instrument”, according to Article 23(3)(b) MiFIR.

However, it must be noted that benchmark trades are just one very obvious case where such purely technical transactions occur. In fact, the requirement that an investment firm “transfers the ownership of the previously executed orders in one single trade” applies to all forms of order execution where the client initiating the order has no securities account with the investment firm executing the order (either because it has a securities account with another institution or because the client is a bank or investment firm himself).

Under such circumstances, no matter whether the original order is a “benchmark-”, “carefully at market-”, “limit-” or “market” order, the investment firm will “transfers the ownership of the previously executed order[s] in one single trade” ex post (and thus this “technical” trade will be determined by “factors other than the current market valuation”) after it has been executed “on-venue” – or OTC (to the extent, MiFID II allows). Therefore, we are of the opinion that it is necessary and it would be desirable and appropriate if ESMA would introduce a general “transfers the ownership of the previously executed orders” category with benchmark trades being one example among others which would fall under this category.

We finally think that ESMA, following the comparable definition of “orders subject to conditions other than the current market price” under the systemic internaliser regime, should include a general clause for not explicitly mentioned trades which are not executed at the prevailing market price in analogy to ESMA’s draft technical advice Paragraph 2(iii) in Chapter 3.4. CP.

<ESMA_QUESTION_96>

Q97: Do you consider it appropriate to include benchmark and/or portfolio trades in the list of those transactions determined by factors other than the current valuation of the share? If not, please provide an explanation with your response.

<ESMA_QUESTION_97>

Bundesverband der Wertpapierfirmen (bwf) comment:

As already stated in our answer to question 96, we strongly agree with ESMA’s assessment that benchmark and portfolio trades should be included in the list of transactions determined by “factors other than the current market valuation”.

<ESMA_QUESTION_97>

3.5. Introduction to the non-equity section and scope of non-equity financial instruments

Q98: Do you agree with the proposed description of structured finance products? If not, please provide arguments and suggestions for an alternative.

<ESMA_QUESTION_98>

TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE

<ESMA_QUESTION_98>



Q99: For the purposes of transparency, should structured finance products be identified in order to distinguish them from other non-equity transferable securities? If so, how should this be done?

<ESMA_QUESTION_99>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_99>

Q100: Do you agree with the proposed explanation for the various types of transferable securities that should be treated as derivatives for pre-trade and post trade transparency? If not, please provide arguments and suggestions for an alternative.

<ESMA_QUESTION_100>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_100>

Q101: Do you agree with ESMA's proposal that for transparency purposes market operators and investment firms operating a trading venue should assume responsibility for determining to which MiFIR category the non-equity financial instruments which they intend to introduce on their trading venue belong and for providing their competent authorities and the market with this information before trading begins?

<ESMA_QUESTION_101>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_101>

Q102: Do you agree with the definitions listed and proposed by ESMA? If not, please provide alternatives.

<ESMA_QUESTION_102>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_102>

3.6. Liquid market definition for non-equity financial instruments

Q103: Do you agree with the proposed approach? If you do not agree please provide reasons for your answers. Could you provide for an alternative approach?

<ESMA_QUESTION_103>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_103>

Q104: Do you agree with the proposed approach? If you do not agree please provide reasons. Could you provide an alternative approach?

<ESMA_QUESTION_104>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_104>

Q105: Do you agree with the proposed approach? If you do not agree please provide reasons. Could you provide an alternative approach?

<ESMA_QUESTION_105>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_105>



Q106: Do you agree with the proposed approach? If you do not agree please provide reasons. Could you provide an alternative approach?

<ESMA_QUESTION_106>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_106>

Q107: Should different thresholds be applied for different (classes of) financial instruments? Please provide proposals and reasons.

<ESMA_QUESTION_107>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_107>

Q108: Do you have any proposals for appropriate spread thresholds? Please provide figures and reasons.

<ESMA_QUESTION_108>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_108>

Q109: How could the data necessary for computing the average spreads be obtained?

<ESMA_QUESTION_109>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_109>

Q110: Do you agree with the proposed approach? If you do not agree please provide reasons for your answer. Could you provide an alternative approach?

<ESMA_QUESTION_110>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_110>

Q111: Overall, could you think of an alternative approach on how to assess whether a market is liquid bearing in mind the various elements of the liquid market definition in MiFIR?

<ESMA_QUESTION_111>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_111>

Q112: Which is your preferred scenario or which combination of thresholds would you propose for defining a liquid market for bonds or for a sub-category of bonds (sovereign, corporate, covered, convertible, etc.)? Please provide reasons for your answer.

<ESMA_QUESTION_112>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_112>

Q113: Should the concept of liquid market be applied to financial instruments (IBIA) or to classes of financial instruments (COFIA)? Would be appropriate to apply IBIA for certain asset classes and COFIA to other asset classes? Please provide reasons for your answers

<ESMA_QUESTION_113>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_113>

Q114: Do you have any (alternative) proposals how to take the ‘range of market conditions and the life-cycle’ of (classes of) financial instruments into account - other than the periodic reviews described in the sections periodic review of the liquidity threshold and periodic assessment of the liquidity of the instrument class, above?

<ESMA_QUESTION_114>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_114>

Q115: Do you have any proposals on how to form homogenous and relevant classes of financial instruments? Which specifics do you consider relevant for that purpose? Please distinguish between bonds, SFPs and (different types of) derivatives and across qualitative criteria (please refer to Annex 3.6.1).

<ESMA_QUESTION_115>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_115>

Q116: Do you think that, in the context of the liquidity thresholds to be calculated under MiFID II, the classification in Annex 3.6.1 is relevant? Which product types or sub-product types would you be inclined to create or merge? Please provide reasons for your answers

<ESMA_QUESTION_116>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_116>

Q117: Do you agree with the proposed approach? If not, please provide rationales and alternatives.

<ESMA_QUESTION_117>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_117>

Q118: Do you agree with the proposed thresholds? If not, please provide rationales and alternatives.

<ESMA_QUESTION_118>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_118>

3.7. Pre-trade transparency requirements for non-equity instruments

Q119: Do you agree with the description of request-for-quote system? If not, how would you describe a request-for-quote system? Please give reasons to support your answer.

<ESMA_QUESTION_119>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_119>

Q120: Do you agree with the inclusion of request-for-stream systems in the definition of request-for-quote system? Please give reasons to support your answer.

<ESMA_QUESTION_120>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_120>



Q121: Do you think that – apart from request-for-stream systems – other functionalities should be included in the definition of request-for-quote system? If yes, please provide a description of this functionality and give reasons to support your answer.

<ESMA_QUESTION_121>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_121>

Q122: Do you agree with the description of voice trading system? If not, how would you describe a voice trading system?

<ESMA_QUESTION_122>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_122>

Q123: Do you agree with the proposed table setting out different types of trading systems for non-equity instruments?

<ESMA_QUESTION_123>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_123>

Q124: Do you think that the information to be made public for each type of trading system provides adequate transparency for each trading system?

<ESMA_QUESTION_124>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_124>

Q125: Besides the trading systems mentioned above, are there additional trading models that need to be considered for pre-trade transparency requirements in the non-equity market space?

<ESMA_QUESTION_125>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_125>

Q126: If you think that additional trading systems should be considered, what information do you think should be made public for each additional type of trading model?

<ESMA_QUESTION_126>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_126>

Q127: Based on your experience, what are the different types of voice trading systems in the market currently? What specific characteristics do these systems have?

<ESMA_QUESTION_127>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_127>

Q128: How do these voice trading systems currently make information public or known to interested parties at the pre-trade stage?

<ESMA_QUESTION_128>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_128>



Q129: Do you agree with ESMA’s approach in relation to the content, method and timing of pre-trade information being made available to the wider public?

<ESMA_QUESTION_129>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_129>

Q130: Do you agree with the above mentioned approach with regard to indicative pre-trade bid and offer prices which are close to the price of the trading interests? Please give reasons to support your answer

<ESMA_QUESTION_130>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_130>

Q131: If you do not agree with the approach described above please provide an alternative

<ESMA_QUESTION_131>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_131>

3.8. Post-trade transparency requirements for non-equity instruments

Q132: Do you agree with the proposed content of post-trade public information? If not, please provide arguments and suggestions for an alternative.

<ESMA_QUESTION_132>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_132>

Q133: Do you think that the current post-trade regime for shares on the systematic internaliser’s identity should be extended to non-equity instruments or that the systematic internaliser’s identity is relevant information which should be published without exception?

<ESMA_QUESTION_133>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_133>

Q134: Is there any other information that would be relevant to the market for the above mentioned asset classes?

<ESMA_QUESTION_134>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_134>

Q135: Do you agree with the proposed table of identifiers for transactions executed on non-equity instruments? Please provide reasons for your answer.

<ESMA_QUESTION_135>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_135>



Q136: Do you support the use of flags to identify trades which have benefitted from the use of deferrals? Should separate flags be used for each type of deferral (e.g. large in scale deferral, size specific to the instrument deferral)? Please provide reasons for your answer.

<ESMA_QUESTION_136>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_136>

Q137: Do you think a flag related to coupon payments (ex/cum) should be introduced? If yes, please describe the cases where such flags would be warranted and which information should be captured.

<ESMA_QUESTION_137>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_137>

Q138: Do you think that give-up/give-in trades (identified with a flag) should be included in post-trade reports or not made public? Please provide reasons for your answers.

<ESMA_QUESTION_138>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_138>

Q139: Do you agree that securities financing transactions should be exempted from the post-trade transparency regime?

<ESMA_QUESTION_139>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_139>

Q140: Do you agree that for the initial application of the new transparency regime the information should be made public within five minutes after the relevant non-equity transaction? Please provide reasons for your answer.

<ESMA_QUESTION_140>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_140>

Q141: Do you agree with the proposed text or would you propose an alternative option? Please provide reasons for your answer.

<ESMA_QUESTION_141>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_141>

Q142: Do you agree that the intra-day deferral periods should range between 60 minutes and 120 minutes?

<ESMA_QUESTION_142>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_142>

Q143: Do you agree that the maximum deferral period, reserved for the largest transactions, should not exceed end of day or, for transactions executed after 15.00, the opening of the following trading day? If not, could you provide alternative proposals? Please provide reasons for your answer.



<ESMA_QUESTION_143>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_143>

Q144: Do you consider there are reasons for applying different deferral periods to different asset classes, e.g. fixing specific deferral periods for sovereign bonds? Please provide arguments to support your answer.

<ESMA_QUESTION_144>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_144>

Q145: Do you support the proposal that the deferral for non-equity instruments which do not have a liquid market should be until the end of day + 1? Please provide reasons for your answer.

<ESMA_QUESTION_145>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_145>

Q146: Do you think that one universal deferral period is appropriate for all non-equity instruments which do not have a liquid market or that the deferrals should be set at a more granular level, depending on asset class and even sub asset class. Please provide reasons for your answer.

<ESMA_QUESTION_146>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_146>

Q147: Do you agree with the proposal that during the deferred period for non-equity instruments which do not have a liquid market, the volume of the transaction should be omitted but all the other details of individual transactions must be published? Please provide reasons for your answer.

<ESMA_QUESTION_147>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_147>

Q148: Do you agree that publication in an aggregated form with respect to sovereign debt should be authorised for an indefinite period only in limited circumstances? Please give reasons for your answers. If you disagree, what alternative approaches would you propose?

<ESMA_QUESTION_148>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_148>

Q149: In your view, which criteria and/or conditions would it be appropriate to specify as indicating there is a need to authorise extended/indefinite deferrals for sovereign debt??

<ESMA_QUESTION_149>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_149>

Q150: In your view, could those transactions determined by other factors than the valuation of the instrument be authorised for deferred publication to the end of day? Please provide reasons for your answer.



<ESMA_QUESTION_150>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_150>

3.9. The transparency regime of non-equity large in scale orders and transactions

Q151: Do you agree with the proposed option? Which option would be more suitable for the calibration of the large in scale requirements within an asset class?

<ESMA_QUESTION_151>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_151>

Q152: Do you consider there are reasons for opting for different options for different asset classes? Please provide arguments.

<ESMA_QUESTION_152>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_152>

Q153: Do you agree that the choice between the two options should be consistent with the approach adopted for the assessment of liquidity? If not, please provide arguments.

<ESMA_QUESTION_153>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_153>

Q154: Do you agree with the proposed approach? If no, which indicator would you consider more appropriate for the determination of large in scale thresholds for orders and transactions?

<ESMA_QUESTION_154>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_154>

Q155: Do you agree that the proxy used for the determining the large in scale thresholds should be the same as the one used to assess the average size of transactions in the context of the definition of liquid markets? Please provide arguments.

<ESMA_QUESTION_155>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_155>

Q156: In your view, which option would be more suitable for the determination of the large in scale thresholds? Please provide arguments.

<ESMA_QUESTION_156>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_156>

Q157: Alternatively which method would you suggest for setting the large in scale thresholds?

<ESMA_QUESTION_157>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_157>

Q158: In your view, should large in scale thresholds for orders differ from the large in scale thresholds for transactions? If yes, which thresholds should be higher: pre-trade or post-trade? Please provide reasons to support your answer.

<ESMA_QUESTION_158>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_158>

Q159: Do you agree that the large in scale thresholds should be computed only on the basis of transactions carried out on trading venues following the implementation of MiFID II? Please, provide reasons for the answer.

<ESMA_QUESTION_159>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_159>

Q160: Do you think that the condition for deferred publication of large in scale transactions currently applying to shares (transaction is between an investment firm that deals on own account and a client of the investment firm) is applicable to non-equity instruments? Please provide reasons for your answer.

<ESMA_QUESTION_160>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_160>

Q161: Do you agree that the large in scale regime should be reviewed no earlier than two years after application of MiFIR in practice?

<ESMA_QUESTION_161>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_161>

3.10. Size specific to the instrument

Q162: Do you agree with the above description of the applicability of the size specific to the instrument? If not please provide reasons for your answer.

<ESMA_QUESTION_162>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_162>

Q163: Do you agree with the proposal that the size specific to the instrument should be set as a percentage of the large in scale size? Please provide reasons for you answer.

<ESMA_QUESTION_163>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_163>

Q164: In your view, what methodologies would be most appropriate for measuring the undue risk in order to set the size specific threshold?



<ESMA_QUESTION_164>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_164>

Q165: Would you suggest any other practical ways in which ESMA could take into account whether, at such sizes, liquidity providers would be able to hedge their risks?

<ESMA_QUESTION_165>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_165>

Q166: Do you agree with ESMA's description of how the size specific to the instrument waiver would interact with the large in scale waiver? Please provide reasons for your answer.

<ESMA_QUESTION_166>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_166>

Q167: Do you agree with ESMA's description of how the size specific to the instrument deferrals would interact with the large in scale deferrals? In particular, do you agree that the deferral periods for the size specific to the instrument and the large in scale should differ and have any specific proposals on how the deferral periods should be calibrated? Please provide reasons for your answer.

<ESMA_QUESTION_167>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_167>

3.11. The Trading Obligation for Derivatives

Q168: Do you agree that there should be consistent categories of derivatives contracts throughout MiFIR/EMIR?

<ESMA_QUESTION_168>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_168>

Q169: Do you agree with this approach to the treatment of third countries?

<ESMA_QUESTION_169>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_169>

Q170: Do you agree with the proposed criteria based anti-avoidance procedure?

<ESMA_QUESTION_170>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_170>

Q171: Do you think it would be reasonable for ESMA to consult venues with regard to which classes of derivatives contracts are traded on venue? Do you think venues would be well placed to undertake this task?

<ESMA_QUESTION_171>



TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_171>

Q172: The discussion in section 3.6 on the liquid market for non-equity instruments around ‘average frequency’, ‘average size’, ‘number and type of active market participants’ and average size of spreads is also relevant to this chapter and we would welcome respondent’s views on any differences in how the trading obligation procedure should approach the following:

<ESMA_QUESTION_172>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_172>

Q173: Do you have a view on how ESMA should approach data gathering about a product’s life cycle, and how a dynamic calibration across that life cycle might work? How frequently should ESMA revisit its assumptions? What factors might lead the reduction of the liquidity of a contract currently traded on venue? Are you able to share with ESMA any analysis related to product lifecycles?

<ESMA_QUESTION_173>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_173>

Q174: Do you have any suggestions on how ESMA should consider the anticipated effects of the trading obligation on end users and on future market behaviour?

<ESMA_QUESTION_174>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_174>

Q175: Do you have any other comments on our overall approach?

<ESMA_QUESTION_175>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_175>

3.12. Transparency Requirements for the Members of ESCB

Q176: Do you agree that the above identifies the types of operations that can be undertaken by a member of the ESCB for the purpose of monetary, foreign exchange and financial stability policy and that are within the MiFID scope? Please give reasons to support your answer.

<ESMA_QUESTION_176>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_176>

Q177: What is your view about the types of transactions for which the member of the ESCB would be able to provide prior notification that the transaction is exempt?

<ESMA_QUESTION_177>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_177>



3.13. Article 22, MiFIR: Providing information for the purposes of transparency and other calculations

Q178: Do you have any comments on the content of requests as outlined above?

<ESMA_QUESTION_178>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_178>

Q179: Do you have proposals on how NCAs could collect specific information on the number and type of market participants in a product?

<ESMA_QUESTION_179>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_179>

Q180: Do you consider the frequency of data requests proposed as appropriate?

<ESMA_QUESTION_180>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_180>

Q181: How often should data be requested in respect of newly issued instruments in order to classify them correctly based on their actual liquidity?

<ESMA_QUESTION_181>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_181>

Q182: What is your view of ESMA's initial assessment of the format of data requests and do you have any proposals for making requests cost-efficient and useful for all parties involved?

<ESMA_QUESTION_182>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_182>

Q183: Do you consider a maximum period of two weeks appropriate for responding to data requests?

<ESMA_QUESTION_183>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_183>

Q184: Do you consider a storage time for relevant data of two years appropriate?

<ESMA_QUESTION_184>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_184>

4. Microstructural issues

4.1. Microstructural issues: common elements for Articles 17, 48 and 49 MiFID II

Q185: Is there any element that has not been considered and/or needs to be further clarified in the ESMA Guidelines that should be addressed in the RTS relating to Articles 17, 48 and 49 of MiFID II?

<ESMA_QUESTION_185>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_185>

Q186: Do you agree with the definition of ‘trading systems’ for trading venues?

<ESMA_QUESTION_186>
Bundesverband der Wertpapierfirmen (bwf) comment:

We agree in general with the definition proposed by ESMA. However, for the sake of clarity and to allow a clear demarcation between “trading system” and others parts of infrastructure used by trading venues and its members or participants, the wording of paragraph 4.1(8) DP should be amended as follows:

“...for the purposes of Article 17, 48 and 49 of MiFID II “trading system” should be defined as hardware, software and associated communication lines used for the purpose of initiating, generating, routing, storing, monitoring, matching and execution of orders by...”

With respect to the question raised in paragraph 4.1(12) DP on the relevance of hybrid systems defined by Article 17(5) MiFID I Implementing Regulation, we would like to emphasise that hybrid market models are of significant importance for trading on all German exchanges. With the local trading landscape being characterised by competition among numerous “regional” exchanges, all of these trading venues operate as least one market model which falls into the category of “hybrid systems” as defined by Article 17(5) MiFID I Implementing Regulation. Typically, these trading systems are designed to fulfil in particular – but not exclusively – the needs of retail investors and SME-issuers.

In general, most of these systems could be characterised as auction based systems with market maker support whereby investment firms are assigned to be responsible for the management of and price determination within order books for specific financial instruments. These order book mandates enclose strict performance rules in terms of frequency and quality of – either firm or indicative – quotes published to the market and the obligation to provide liquidity by employing an investment firms’ own capital if needed.

It should be also noted that, partly as a result of the design of best execution requirements introduced with MiFID I (with the speed of execution together with the overall price being the core benchmark for best execution when executing retail orders), the importance of market making activities within these systems has grown significantly during the last years.

<ESMA_QUESTION_186>

Q187: Do you agree that the requirements under Articles 48 and 49 of MiFID II are only relevant for continuous auction order book systems and quote-driven trading systems and not for the other systems mentioned above?

<ESMA_QUESTION_187>

Bundesverband der Wertpapierfirmen (bvf) comment:

Our own views are in line with ESMA's assessment that the requirements under Articles 48 and 49 of MiFID II are only relevant for continuous auction order book systems and quote-driven trading systems. Consequently, these requirements, in particular the provisions on market making activities and market making schemes, should be applied to hybrid systems only to the extent that they can be applied in a way which does not degenerate or undermines the mechanisms of price discovery and liquidity provision specific to these market models.

In this context, it must be emphasised that MiFID II / MiFIR do not intend to abolish or prohibit "hybrid systems" as defined by Article 17(5) MiFID I Implementing Regulation. Therefore it is paramount that the requirements under Articles 48 and 49 of MiFID II must not be interpreted in a way which would result in reducing investor's choice with respect to the type of market models available which suits best their individual needs.

<ESMA_QUESTION_187>

Q188: Which hybrid systems, if any, should be considered within the scope of Articles 48 and 49, and why?

<ESMA_QUESTION_188>

Bundesverband der Wertpapierfirmen (bvf) comments:

Please refer to our general comment regarding the application of Articles 48 and 49 of MiFID II given in our answer to question 187 DP.

<ESMA_QUESTION_188>

Q189: Do you agree with the definition of "trading system" for investment firms?

<ESMA_QUESTION_189>

Bundesverband der Wertpapierfirmen (bvf) comment:

We agree in principle with ESMA's definition of "trading systems" for investment firms. However, the term "...that generally involve the high frequency generation of orders" should be changed to "...that may involve the high frequency generation of orders" giving proper attention to Recital 61 MiFID II which rightly states that high frequency trading means a specific subset of algorithmic trading. Accordingly, impression that algorithmic trading is "generally" linked to high frequency trading should be avoided.

<ESMA_QUESTION_189>

Q190: Do you agree with the definition of 'real time' in relation to market monitoring of algorithmic trading activity by investment firms?

<ESMA_QUESTION_190>

Bundesverband der Wertpapierfirmen (bvf) comment:

Please refer to our answer given on question 191 DP.

<ESMA_QUESTION_190>

Q191: Is the requirement that real time monitoring should take place with a delay of maximum 5 seconds appropriate for the risks inherent to algorithmic trading and from an operational perspective? Should the time frame be longer or shorter? Please state your reasons.



<ESMA_QUESTION_191>

Bundesverband der Wertpapierfirmen (bwf) comment:

According to Article 17(1) MiFID II, “An investment firm that engages in algorithmic trading shall have in place effective systems and risk controls suitable to the business it operates”. ESMA’s proposal to request a “real time” monitoring not only of positions but of “order events” with a “one fits it all” 5 seconds definition of the time span which should be considered to fulfil the “real time” requirement does not adequately reflect the principle of proportionality which is clearly recognised in the Level I text. MiFID II neither generally calls for a “real time” monitoring nor does it require an obligatory surveillance on the level of “order events”.

Not to be mistaken, we do not object that firms active in high frequency trading, running high trading volumes generated without human intervention and with the latest low latency technology employed, should be required to use monitoring technology which is “on eye level” with their trading environment. This indeed might require “real time” monitoring and control through the lifecycle of an order. On the other hand, conservative trading strategies which might fall in the algorithm category simply because of the level of automation involved, e.g. long established quote machines for market makers which might work on parameters which allow for matching and execution of orders without human intervention up to a predefined order size and execution frequency, certainly would not fall into the same risk category as low latency HFT-engines.

Consequently, for quote machines calibrated as described, an effective and appropriate level of risk control can be achieved without a “real time” monitoring on “order event level”, simply because the maximum possible exposure which can result from automated trading is efficiently controlled by setting ex ante limits in terms of frequency and volume of execution. Positions resulting from automated (and non automated) trading will be monitored in near time by the market maker firms risk control unit which checks accumulating executed trades against defined position limits when execution data becomes available via the data stream from the execution venue.

From these very divergent examples, we think, it should be intuitively clear, that any “one fits it all” solution for risk controls for algorithmic trading cannot be brought in line with the Level I requirements which clearly and understandably call for a proportionate regime.

<ESMA_QUESTION_191>

Q192: Do you agree with the definition of ‘t+1’ in relation to market monitoring of algorithmic trading activity by investment firms?

<ESMA_QUESTION_192>

Bundesverband der Wertpapierfirmen (bwf) comment:

ESMA is right as far as it concludes that trade monitoring for the purpose the identification of suspicious transactions under the market abuse regime does not and cannot be conducted on a real time basis. However, to the extent that ESMA’s proposal at least implicitly expects that monitoring of market abuse necessarily needs to be operated on the basis of an automated alert-driven system, we would like to object this conclusion in two ways:

First, when defining the technical and operational requirements for market abuse monitoring, the same principle of proportionality as with respect to the requirements for risk monitoring shall apply. This means that the operational arrangements shall reflect and be appropriate in the light of the business a firm operates. Accordingly, the volume and complexity as well as the question whether only proprietary transactions or also client orders need to be monitored, has to be taken into account. This means that for smaller in mid sized firms, we cannot agree with a general obligation to have an automated alert system in place. For these firms, there is no empirical evidence that transaction reports being analysed solely on the basis of professional expertise of compliance personnel being assigned to this task would result in an insufficient surveillance intensity. Second, even for large firms for which an automated, alert driven,



surveillance system might be appropriate, not all of the monitoring work can be conducted on the basis of fully automated surveillance outputs (alerts).

This said, we are of the opinion that if an automated surveillance is employed, alert reports should be available for analysis on the day following the trading day. However, we see no need that such data needs to be made available “before market opening” which would indeed require for the reports to be computed overnight. This seems to be clearly impractical and disproportionate, especially when trading data from different sources needs to be aggregated before analysis in order to provide for meaningful results.

<ESMA_QUESTION_192>

Q193: Do you agree with the parameters to be considered to define situations of ‘severe market stress’ and ‘disorderly trading conditions’?

<ESMA_QUESTION_193>

TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE

<ESMA_QUESTION_193>

Q194: Do you agree with the above approach?

<ESMA_QUESTION_194>

TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE

<ESMA_QUESTION_194>

Q195: Is there any element that should be added to/removed from the periodic self-assessment?

<ESMA_QUESTION_195>

TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE

<ESMA_QUESTION_195>

Q196: Would the MiFID II organisational requirements for investment firms undertaking algorithmic trading fit all the types of investment firms you are aware of? Please elaborate.

<ESMA_QUESTION_196>

TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE

<ESMA_QUESTION_196>

Q197: Do you agree with the approach described above regarding the application of the proportionality principle by investment firms? Please elaborate.

<ESMA_QUESTION_197>

TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE

<ESMA_QUESTION_197>

Q198: Are there any additional elements that for the purpose of clarity should be added to/removed from the non-exhaustive list contained in the RTS? Please elaborate.

<ESMA_QUESTION_198>

TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE

<ESMA_QUESTION_198>

4.2. Organisational requirements for investment firms (Article 17 MiFID II)



Q199: Do you agree with a restricted deployment of algorithms in a live environment? Please elaborate

<ESMA_QUESTION_199>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_199>

Q200: Do you agree with the parameters outlined for initial restriction? Please elaborate.

<ESMA_QUESTION_200>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_200>

Q201: Do you agree with the proposed testing scenarios outlined above? Would you propose any alternative or additional testing scenarios? Please elaborate.

<ESMA_QUESTION_201>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_201>

Q202: Do you agree with ESMA's approach regarding the conditions under which investment firms should make use of non-live trading venue testing environments? Please elaborate.

<ESMA_QUESTION_202>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_202>

Q203: Do you consider that ESMA should specify more in detail what should be the minimum functionality or the types of testing that should be carried out in non-live trading venue testing environments, and if so, which?

<ESMA_QUESTION_203>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_203>

Q204: Do you consider that the requirements around change management are appropriately laid down, especially with regard to testing? Please elaborate.

<ESMA_QUESTION_204>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_204>

Q205: Do you agree with the proposed monitoring and review approach? Is a twice yearly review, as a minimum, appropriate?

<ESMA_QUESTION_205>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_205>

Q206: To what extent do you agree with the usage of drop copies in the context of monitoring? Which sources of drop copies would be most important?

<ESMA_QUESTION_206>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_206>



Q207: Do you agree with the proposed approach?

<ESMA_QUESTION_207>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_207>

Q208: Is the proposed list of pre trade controls adequate? Are there any you would add to or remove from the list?

<ESMA_QUESTION_208>
Bundesverband der Wertpapierfirmen (bwf) comment:

The list of pre trade controls which ESMA suggests might be appropriate for high frequency trading or trading environments with a highly complex risk profile but they are clearly disproportionate as a “minimum standard” for all forms of automated trading, e.g. simple quote machines used by traditional market makers.

With respect to “market maker protections”, discussed in Paragraph 63 of Chapter 4.2. DP, we agree that market makers should be able to effectively control and limit the market risk, they may be exposed to. However, the methodology how to obtain this objective should remain within a firms own responsibility.

<ESMA_QUESTION_208>

Q209: To what extent do you consider it appropriate to request having all the pre-trade controls in place? In which cases would it not be appropriate? Please elaborate.

<ESMA_QUESTION_209>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_209>

Q210: Do you agree with the record keeping approach outlined above?

<ESMA_QUESTION_210>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_210>

Q211: In particular, what are your views regarding the storage of the parameters used to calibrate the trading algorithms and the market data messages on which the algorithm’s decision is based?

<ESMA_QUESTION_211>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_211>

Q212: Do you consider that the requirements regarding the scope, capabilities, and flexibility of the monitoring system are appropriate?

<ESMA_QUESTION_212>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_212>

Q213: Trade reconciliation – should a more prescriptive deadline be set for reconciling trade and account information?

<ESMA_QUESTION_213>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_213>

Q214: Periodic reviews – would a minimum requirement of undertaking reviews on a half-yearly basis seem reasonable for investment firms engaged in algorithmic trading activity, and if not, what would be an appropriate minimum interval for undertaking such reviews? Should a more prescriptive rule be set as to when more frequent reviews need be taken?

<ESMA_QUESTION_214>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_214>

Q215: Are there any elements that have not been considered and / or need to be further clarified here?

<ESMA_QUESTION_215>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_215>

Q216: What is your opinion of the elements that the DEA provider should take into account when performing the due diligence assessment? In your opinion, should any elements be added or removed? If so, which?

<ESMA_QUESTION_216>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_216>

Q217: Do you agree that for assessing the adequacy of the systems and controls of a prospective DEA user, the DEA provider should use the systems and controls requirements applied by trading venues for members as a benchmark?

<ESMA_QUESTION_217>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_217>

Q218: Do you agree that a long term prior relationship (in other areas of service than DEA) between the investment firm and a client facilitates the due diligence process for providing DEA and, thus, additional precautions and diligence are needed when allowing a new client (to whom the investment firm has never provided any other services previously) to use DEA? If yes, to what extent does a long term relationship between the investment firm and a client facilitate the due diligence process of the DEA provider? Please elaborate.

<ESMA_QUESTION_218>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_218>

Q219: Do you agree with the above approach? Please elaborate.

<ESMA_QUESTION_219>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_219>

Q220: Do you agree with the above approach, specifically with regard to the granular identification of DEA user order flow as separate from the firm's other order flow? Please elaborate.

<ESMA_QUESTION_220>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_220>



Q221: Are there any criteria other than those listed above against which clearing firms should be assessing their potential clients?

<ESMA_QUESTION_221>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_221>

Q222: Should clearing firms disclose their criteria (some or all of them) in order to help potential clients to assess their ability to become clients of clearing firms (either publicly or on request from prospective clients)?

<ESMA_QUESTION_222>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_222>

Q223: How often should clearing firms review their clients' ongoing performance against these criteria?

<ESMA_QUESTION_223>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_223>

Q224: Should clearing firms have any arrangement(s) other than position limits and margins to limit their risk exposure to clients (counterparty, liquidity, operational and any other risks)? For example, should clearing firms stress-test clients' positions that could pose material risk to the clearing firms, test their own ability to meet initial margin and variation margin requirements, test their own ability to liquidate their clients' positions in an orderly manner and estimate the cost of the liquidation, test their own credit lines?

<ESMA_QUESTION_224>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_224>

Q225: How regularly should clearing firms monitor their clients' compliance with such limits and margin requirements (e.g. intra-day, overnight) and any other tests, as applicable?

<ESMA_QUESTION_225>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_225>

Q226: Should clearing firms have a real-time view on their clients' positions?

<ESMA_QUESTION_226>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_226>

Q227: How should clearing firms manage their risks in relation to orders from managers on behalf of multiple clients for execution as a block and post-trade allocation to individual accounts for clearing?

<ESMA_QUESTION_227>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_227>



Q228: Which type(s) of automated systems would enable clearing members to monitor their risks (including clients' compliance with limits)? Which criteria should apply to any such automated systems (e.g. should they enable clearing firms to screen clients' orders for compliance with the relevant limits etc.)?

<ESMA_QUESTION_228>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_228>

4.3. Organisational requirements for trading venues (Article 48 MiFID II)

Q229: Do you agree with requiring trading venues to perform due diligence on all types of entities willing to become members/participants of a trading venue which permits algorithmic trading through its systems?

<ESMA_QUESTION_229>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_229>

Q230: Do you agree with the list of minimum requirements that in all cases trading venues should assess prior to granting and while maintaining membership? Should the requirements for entities not authorised as credit institutions or not registered as investment firms be more stringent than for those who are qualified as such?

<ESMA_QUESTION_230>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_230>

Q231: If you agree that non-investment firms and non-credit institutions should be subject to more stringent requirements to become member or participants, which type of additional information should they provide to trading venues?

<ESMA_QUESTION_231>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_231>

Q232: Do you agree with the list of parameters to be monitored in real time by trading venues? Would you add/delete/redefine any of them? In particular, are there any trading models permitting algorithmic trading through their systems for which that list would be inadequate? Please elaborate.

<ESMA_QUESTION_232>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_232>

Q233: Regarding the periodic review of the systems, is there any element that has not been considered and/or needs to be further clarified in the ESMA Guidelines that should be included?

<ESMA_QUESTION_233>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_233>

Q234: Do you agree with the above approach?



<ESMA_QUESTION_234>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_234>

Q235: Do you think ESMA should determine minimum standards in terms of latency or is it preferable to consider as a benchmark of performance the principle “no order lost, no transaction lost”?

<ESMA_QUESTION_235>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_235>

Q236: Do you agree with requiring trading venues to be able to accommodate at least twice the historical peak of messages?

<ESMA_QUESTION_236>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_236>

Q237: Do you agree with the list of abilities that trading venues should have to ensure the resilience of the market?

<ESMA_QUESTION_237>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_237>

Q238: Do you agree with the publication of the general framework by the trading venues? Where would it be necessary to have more/less granularity?

<ESMA_QUESTION_238>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_238>

Q239: Which in your opinion is the degree of discretion that trading venues should have when deciding to cancel, vary or correct orders and transactions?

<ESMA_QUESTION_239>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_239>

Q240: Do you agree with the above principles for halting or constraining trading?

<ESMA_QUESTION_240>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_240>

Q241: Do you agree that trading venues should make the operating mode of their trading halts public?

<ESMA_QUESTION_241>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_241>

Q242: Should trading venues also make the actual thresholds in place public? In your view, would this publication offer market participants the necessary predictability and certainty, or would it entail risks? Please elaborate.



<ESMA_QUESTION_242>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_242>

Q243: Do you agree with the proposal above?

<ESMA_QUESTION_243>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_243>

Q244: Should trading venues have the ability to impose the process, content and timing of conformance tests? If yes, should they charge for this service separately?

<ESMA_QUESTION_244>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_244>

Q245: Should alternative means of conformance testing be permitted?

<ESMA_QUESTION_245>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_245>

Q246: Could alternative means of testing substitute testing scenarios provided by trading venues to avoid disorderly trading conditions? Do you consider that a certificate from an external IT audit would be also sufficient for these purposes?

<ESMA_QUESTION_246>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_246>

Q247: What are the minimum capabilities that testing environments should meet to avoid disorderly trading conditions?

<ESMA_QUESTION_247>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_247>

Q248: Do you agree with the proposed approach?

<ESMA_QUESTION_248>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_248>

Q249: In particular, should trading venues require any other pre-trade controls?

<ESMA_QUESTION_249>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_249>

Q250: Do you agree that for the purposes of Article 48(5) the relevant market in terms of liquidity should be determined according to the approach described above? If, not, please state your reasons.

<ESMA_QUESTION_250>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_250>

Q251: Are there any other markets that should be considered material in terms of liquidity for a particular instrument? Please elaborate.

<ESMA_QUESTION_251>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_251>

Q252: Which of the above mentioned approaches is the most adequate to fulfil the goals of Article 48? Please elaborate

<ESMA_QUESTION_252>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_252>

Q253: Do you envisage any other approach to this matter?

<ESMA_QUESTION_253>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_253>

Q254: Do you agree with the list of elements that should be published by trading venues to permit the provision of DEA to its members or participants?

<ESMA_QUESTION_254>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_254>

Q255: Do you agree with the list of systems and effective controls that at least DEA providers should have in place?

<ESMA_QUESTION_255>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_255>

Q256: Do you consider it is necessary to clarify anything in relation to the description of the responsibility regime?

<ESMA_QUESTION_256>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_256>

Q257: Do you consider necessary for trading venues to have any other additional power with respect of the provision of DEA?

<ESMA_QUESTION_257>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_257>

4.4. Market making strategies, market making agreements and market making schemes

Q258: Do you agree with the previous assessment? If not, please elaborate.

<ESMA_QUESTION_258>



Bundesverband der Wertpapierfirmen (bvf) comment:

We agree with ESMA that with respect to market making agreements Article 17 and 48 of MiFID II are correlated and should be read and applied in conjunction with each other. In other words, the “written agreements” as a requirement for “firms pursuing a market making strategy” referred to in Article 48(1)(a) MiFID II should be understood as an obligation for firms which meet the conditions of Article 17(3) MiFID II only.

In this context, it is important to recall the political intention behind Article 17(3) MiFID II which is first and foremost to address the problems of so call “shadow market making” in connexion with unpredictable and unstable “sunny day liquidity” which might result from the former. In today’s markets, algorithmic trading firms, notwithstanding whether they fall into the HFT category or not, might, solely or as part of their trading strategies, operate as de facto market makers to the extent that they post two side quotes in order to pocket the bid- offer-spread.

However, unlike traditional market makers, they do so usually with a very limited willingness to absorb market risk. As a result, these firms are usually pursuing their “market making strategies” in rather liquid instruments, without managing any significant inventory and usually only in phases of low volatility. In times of fierce market conditions, these “shadow market makers” may temporarily quit trading, extracting liquidity from the market when it is needed most and leave the problem to deal with strong price movements to traditional market makers, which usually have a detailed written agreement with the market operator.

Against this background, we are principally in support of the political intention behind Article 17(3) MiFID II to tackle this problem by obliging also de facto market makers to certain minimum standards for providing liquidity on a regular and predictable basis, specified in binding written agreements with the regulated market as long as “such a requirement is appropriate to the nature and scale of the trading on that regulated market”. In other words, addressing the problems which might result from activities which are so far known as “shadow market making” must not impair the capability and authority of regulated markets to implement and operate market models which provide for an orderly and liquid trading. In particular, Article 17(3) MiFID II, neither was intended to nor must it result in any undue dependence of regulated market on algorithmic or even HFT firms in order to provide for a stable and sufficiently liquid market conditions.

*In this context, please refer also to our answer to question 187 DP.
<ESMA_QUESTION_258>*

Q259: Do you agree with the preliminary assessments above? What practical consequences would it have if firms would also be captured by Article 17(4) MiFID II when posting only one-way quotes, but doing so in different trading venues on different sides of the order book (i.e. posting buy quotes in venue A and sell quotes in venue B for the same instrument)?

<ESMA_QUESTION_259>

Bundesverband der Wertpapierfirmen (bvf) comment:

We would consider firms being active with different sides of their order book on different trading venues, resulting in entering into a position on one venue and unwinding the position on another venue, more likely to be pursuing an arbitrage than a market maker strategy in its original sense. We regret that the Level I text remains rather unclear in this respect: While it should be expressly possible to pursue a market making strategy across different venues, it remains highly questionable whether a firm being active only on one side of the order book in a given market could be considered to fulfil the requirement of “providing liquidity on a regular and frequent basis” by such restrictive activities.

<ESMA_QUESTION_259>

Q260: For how long should the performance of a certain strategy be monitored to determine whether it meets the requirements of Article 17(4) of MiFID II?

<ESMA_QUESTION_260>

Bundesverband der Wertpapierfirmen (bvf) comment:

So far, we have no consolidated opinion on a proper and adequate design and calibration of technical details regarding the procedures of examination whether a firm falls under Article 17(3) MiFID II or not. In general, we think that these criteria should be developed in close coordination with the operators of the regulated markets and being implemented in a harmonized way.

<ESMA_QUESTION_260>

Q261: What percentage of the observation period should a strategy meet with regard to the requirements of Article 17(4) of MiFID II so as to consider that it should be captured by the obligation to enter into a market making agreement?

<ESMA_QUESTION_261>

Bundesverband der Wertpapierfirmen (bvf) comment:

Please refer to our answer to question 260 DP.

<ESMA_QUESTION_261>

Q262: Do you agree with the above assessment?

<ESMA_QUESTION_262>

Bundesverband der Wertpapierfirmen (bvf) comment:

We do not agree with ESMA's assessment and the equalisation of the membership requirement for market makers in the context of the short selling regime and the requirement to be "a member or participant" of a regulated market for the purpose of Article 17(4) MiFID II.

Both provisions are neither identical nor do they follow the same regulatory purpose. While the qualification as market maker in the context of the short selling regime results in certain privileges under the regime, Article 17(4) MiFID II aims to identify firms which will be obliged to fulfil certain minimum standards in terms of liquidity provision when acting as de facto market makers in order to prevent market disruptions and – at least in part – to reduce the competitive distortion, regular or traditional market makers are facing with respect to their "shadow market making" competitors.

Furthermore, since firms with DEA arrangements may (and do) use this form of market access also in order to pursue "market making strategies", we think it would clearly contradict the legislative intention not to consider these firms as "participants" for the purpose of Article 17(4) MiFID II. Not only would these create an easily to use regulatory loop hole but it would also create a competitive disadvantage for those firms which are already a "member" of a regulated market.

<ESMA_QUESTION_262>

Q263: Do you agree with this interpretation?

<ESMA_QUESTION_263>

Bundesverband der Wertpapierfirmen (bvf) comment:

We agree with the definition of "posting firm quotes" within the scope of Article 17(4) MiFID II. However, while it is the intention of Article 17 MiFID II to establish, within its limited scope of application, minimum standards for liquidity provision for firms which had not to fulfil any such obligations in the past, the definition must not result in any infringement of regulated markets and investment firms acting as regular or traditional market makers to enter into agreements with more complex quoting requirements which may enclose the publication of "executable" as well as "indicative" quotes at different stages of the pricing mechanism.

<ESMA_QUESTION_263>

Q264: Do you agree with the above assessment? If not, please elaborate.

<ESMA_QUESTION_264>

Bundesverband der Wertpapierfirmen (bwf) comment:

We agree with ESMA's assessment that single sided or cross instrument strategies should not be regarded to be within the scope of Article 17 MiFID II.

<ESMA_QUESTION_264>

Q265: Do you agree with the above interpretation?

<ESMA_QUESTION_265>

Bundesverband der Wertpapierfirmen (bwf) comment:

We believe that a one second time window would be sufficiently narrow to fulfil the requirement of "simultaneity". However, it should be noted that this does not mean that quotes need to be updated on both sides of the order book "simultaneously". Depending on market conditions, single sided updates either on the bid or the ask side of the order book might be justified and necessary, as long as the resulting spread is still sufficiently narrow.

<ESMA_QUESTION_265>

Q266: Do you agree with the above proposal?

<ESMA_QUESTION_266>

Bundesverband der Wertpapierfirmen (bwf) comment:

We do not think that monitoring a firm's overall exposure in a specific instrument would be an appropriate way forward for the "comparable size" test. Instead, comparable size should be determined and measured with respect to the market making strategies pursued only, even though if there are practical difficulties to identify these strategies from an external point of view. However, such difficulties cannot be addressed by observing a firm's overall exposure which, according to the aggregated nature of the data, could easily and frequently result in "false positive" and "false negative" results. Consequently, it should fall within the responsibility of a firm to demonstrate that it fulfils the "comparable size" criterion, if there is any reasonable doubt.

<ESMA_QUESTION_266>

Q267: Do you agree with the above proposal?

<ESMA_QUESTION_267>

Bundesverband der Wertpapierfirmen (bwf) comment:

We agree with ESMA's proposal to use the methodology already developed in the Guidelines for market making activities under the Short Selling Regulation regime for the purpose of defining "competitive prices" in the context of Article 17 MiFID II.

<ESMA_QUESTION_267>

Q268: Do you agree with the approach described (non-exhaustive list of quoting parameters)?

<ESMA_QUESTION_268>

Bundesverband der Wertpapierfirmen (bwf) comment:

In Paragraph 30 of Chapter 4.4 DP, ESMA correctly accentuates "the variety of trading and business models in Europe". And it should be added that there is no observable political intention in the Level I text that MiFID II shall reduce the existing diversity of trading models, investors can choose from.

While we agree in principle with the approach of “a minimum non-exhaustive list of quoting parameters” for the purpose of defining market making agreements in accordance with Article 17(3) in connexion with Article 48(2)/(3) MiFID II, it must be emphasised once more that requirements defined for this purpose must not impair the ability of regulated markets to define and implement divergent market maker agreements for market maker arrangements which are not covered or not fully covered by the scope of Article 17(3) MiFID II whose purpose lies in the mandatory extension of quoting obligations for firms which act as de facto or “shadow” market makers but so far have not been subject to any binding standards regarding the stable and predictable provision of liquidity. Please see also to our answers to questions 186 and 187 DP.

The fact that MiFID II at this point intends to implement a specific regime for a specific type of firms and not for market makers in general (which are defined in Article 4(7) MiFID II without any reference to algorithmic trading), also becomes apparent from the clarification given in Article 17(4) that “market making strategy” in this context shall have a meaning for the purpose of this Article and Article 48 MiFID II only. Consequently, the “market making schemes” referred to in Article 48(12)(f) MiFID II obtain their meaning only with respect to the “written agreements” referred to in Article 48(2)(a) and Article 17(3)(b) MiFID II for firms pursuing a “market making strategy”, which – as demonstrated - is given a limited scope under Article 17(4).

While “scheme” remains a generic term, we therefore think that it is somehow unfortunate that ESMA, in Paragraph 45 of Chapter 4.4 DP talks about “market making schemes” when analysing certain details of market making arrangements which are currently in place.

<ESMA_QUESTION_268>

Q269: What should be the parameters to assess whether the market making schemes under Article 48 of MiFID II have effectively contributed to more orderly markets?

<ESMA_QUESTION_269>

Bundesverband der Wertpapierfirmen (bwf) comment:

According to Article 48(6) MiFID II, regulated markets, when fulfilling requirements to be set by Member States, shall obligate members and participants operating algorithmic trading systems (which undoubtedly includes algorithmic trading in order to pursue market making strategies) to ensure that these systems “cannot create or contribute to disorderly trading conditions”. However, in reverse, we cannot construe any obligation for the implementation of a “positive test” that market making schemes “have effectively contributed to more orderly markets”, neither from the Level I text nor from ESMA’s mandate.

<ESMA_QUESTION_269>

Q270: Do you agree with the list of requirements set out above? Is there any requirement that should be added / removed and if so why?

<ESMA_QUESTION_270>

Bundesverband der Wertpapierfirmen (bwf) comment:

While ESMA presents a comprehensive list of organisational requirements which shall be fulfilled by investment firms participating in a market making agreement, in order to identify and monitor market making activities and to intervene in such activities when needed, the list of requirements misses any obligation for investment firms to have in place effective systems, procedures and arrangements to ensure its trading systems are resilient and have sufficient capacity, according to the scale and complexity of its trading activities, in the first place.

With respect to the requirements specified in Paragraph 34(iv.) of Chapter 4.4 DP, we would like to refer to our answer to question 192 DP where we have demonstrated that a requirement for monitoring via automated alert-driven systems might be disproportionate under certain circumstances.

Paragraph 34(vii.) of Chapter 4.4 DP suggests the mandatory implementation of remuneration schemes which – in our opinion – would lead to a duplication of regulatory provisions, since the avoidance of undue incentives resulting from remuneration practices is already sufficiently addressed by other parts of financial market regulation, in particular within the CRD IV framework. Therefore, this requirement should be deleted.

Otherwise, the list of organisational requirements appears to be generally appropriate.
<ESMA_QUESTION_270>

Q271: Please provide views, with reasons, on what would be an adequate presence of market making strategies during trading hours?

<ESMA_QUESTION_271>

Bundesverband der Wertpapierfirmen (bwf) comments:

In our view, the an 80% presence requirement which would be in line with the requirements for market makers under Regulation (EU) 236/2012 on short selling and certain aspects of credit default swaps, would be a pragmatic way forward.

However, the appropriateness of any presence time cannot be judged without an assessment on the definition of “exceptional circumstances” under which the quoting obligation would be temporarily waived.

<ESMA_QUESTION_271>

Q272: Do you consider that the average presence time under a market making strategy should be the same as the presence time required under a market making agreement ?

<ESMA_QUESTION_272>

Bundesverband der Wertpapierfirmen (bwf) comment:

Here, we have a problem in understanding the question. Practically speaking, the presence time required under the market maker agreement would work as a benchmark within the individual market making strategy of a firm. In order to ensure that the benchmark is met, a firm might wish to parameterise its systems with a certain “safety margin”, if it will not try to reach a 100% presence time anyway.

<ESMA_QUESTION_272>

Q273: Should the presence of market making strategies during trading hours be the same across instruments and trading models? If you think it should not, please indicate how this requirement should be specified by different products or market models?

<ESMA_QUESTION_273>

Bundesverband der Wertpapierfirmen (bwf) comment:

Assuming that the relevance of market making agreements under Article 17(3) MiFID II and the requirements defined in Article 48 MiFID II will – as ESMA suggests in question 187 DP – be limited to continuous auction order book systems and quote driven trading systems, we would be in favour of a harmonised minimum standard in terms of presence time required.

<ESMA_QUESTION_273>

Q274: Article 48(3) of MiFID II states that the market making agreement should reflect “where applicable any other obligation arising from participation in the scheme”. What in your opinion are the additional areas that that agreement should cover?

<ESMA_QUESTION_274>

Bundesverband der Wertpapierfirmen (bwf) comment:

While the intention of this part of the Level I text is not completely clear to us, a meaningful interpretation could be that the operator of a regulated market might wish to define certain additional requirements which complement or exceed the minimum requirements set on a regulatory level.

This could legitimately include e.g. enabling technical systems and parameters to connect to and to participate in a specific market, a more sophisticated set of performance benchmarks to be met, requirements with respect to the quantity and qualification of human resources being employed, the definition of communication lines or specific provisions in order to ensure business continuity.

<ESMA_QUESTION_274>

Q275: Do you disagree with any of the events that would qualify as ‘exceptional circumstances’? Please elaborate.

<ESMA_QUESTION_275>

Bundesverband der Wertpapierfirmen (bwf) comment:

We do not disagree with any of the events that would qualify as ‘exceptional circumstances’.

<ESMA_QUESTION_275>

Q276: Are there any additional ‘exceptional circumstances’ (e.g. reporting events or new fundamental information becoming available) that should be considered by ESMA? Please elaborate.

<ESMA_QUESTION_276>

Bundesverband der Wertpapierfirmen (bwf) comment:

As a general remark, the meaning of “exceptional” should be clarified. In particular, the application of “exceptional” should not be restricted to extraordinary or unforeseeable events but should also include “exceptions” resulting from the specific characteristics of a market model and which therefore might arise on a regular basis.

A typical example for the later might be that a regular halt of continuous quotation usually takes place in a time window around the opening, closing or mid day auction. With respect to “exceptional” in the meaning of “extraordinary” circumstances, the list of such events should include in particular trading halts initiated by the market operator (e.g. vola-interrupts or suspension of trading in cases where new significant information arrives for a specific instrument). Where a market maker pursues a market making strategy with respect to an instrument whose most liquid market lies on another trading venue, a trading stop on this reference market should also temporarily waive the quoting obligation on the market where the market maker is active under a market maker agreement. Last but not least, in situations where a market maker identifies order book entries which, with an effectual likelihood, might raise substantial concerns of manipulative behaviour by other market participants, the market maker should be permitted to interrupt its quotation until the order book situation has normalised and orderly trading resumes.

<ESMA_QUESTION_276>

Q277: What type of events might be considered under the definition of political and macroeconomic issues?

<ESMA_QUESTION_277>

Bundesverband der Wertpapierfirmen (bwf) comment:

Without providing an exhaustive list, such events should include in particular severe natural and technological disasters which have a grave impact on public life and economic activity in an area or country, incidents of war or terrorist attacks, serious political upheaval or revolution, profound currency turbulences or devaluations, the introduction of cross boarder capital controls and serious restrictions on international trade as well as cases of national bankruptcy.

<ESMA_QUESTION_277>

Q278: What is an appropriate timeframe for determining whether exceptional circumstances no longer apply?

<ESMA_QUESTION_278>

Bundesverband der Wertpapierfirmen (bwf) comment:

We are of the opinion that no generally applicable timeframe can be ex ante defined for this class of events. Accordingly, decisions would have to be made on a case by case level.

<ESMA_QUESTION_278>

Q279: What would be an appropriate procedure to restart normal trading activities (e.g. auction periods, notifications, timeframe)?

<ESMA_QUESTION_279>

Bundesverband der Wertpapierfirmen (bwf) comment:

We think that regulated markets should have a sufficiently high level of discretion in order to decide about the time and to define and implement procedures to restart normal trading. The market operator should communicate to the market in due time and on the basis of sufficiently detailed information when trading will resume.

<ESMA_QUESTION_279>

Q280: Do you agree with this approach? If not, please elaborate.

<ESMA_QUESTION_280>

Bundesverband der Wertpapierfirmen (bwf) comment:

Please refer to our answers to questions 276 through 279 DP. Furthermore, it is obvious that the handling of “exceptional circumstances” in the case of severe disruptions need to be carried out in a consistent and harmonised way and will impact the market as a whole. Therefore, to this extent, the task will be to include market maker schemes in a general policy and not to establish an isolated regime of its own.

<ESMA_QUESTION_280>

Q281: Would further clarification be necessary regarding what is “fair and non-discriminatory”? In particular, are there any cases of discriminatory access that should be specifically addressed?

<ESMA_QUESTION_281>

Bundesverband der Wertpapierfirmen (bwf) comment:

In Paragraph 44 of Chapter 4.4 DP proposes a more detailed definition of “fair and non-discriminatory” access to market making schemes in the form of a most favoured treatment clause. While we fully support that any regulation should be bound to the same business, same rules principle, we think that ESMA’s wording could be misleading when read in isolation.

Once again, it needs to be remembered that the political intention behind the implementation of market maker schemes lies in a harmonised rule in order to address the problem of unpredictable swings in market liquidity which may result in particular from so far non-regulated activities of algorithmic trading firms pursuing de facto market making activities without any binding agreement with the regulated market in terms of providing liquidity on a frequent and predictable basis (usually referred to as “shadow market makers”).

MiFID II enables regulated markets to alleviate problems arising from unstable liquidity as a result of shadow market making activities by obliging firms which fall under Article 17(3) MiFID II to enter into binding agreements with the market operator in terms of minimum requirements for quoting obligations and liquidity provision. According to Article 48(12)(f) in connexion with Article 17(4) MiFID II,

ESMA shall develop draft technical standards for common frameworks – referred to as “market making schemes” – which regulated markets will have to adhere to when closing agreements with these firms. To this extent, the access to these schemes – if implemented, should be “fair and non-discriminatory” indeed.

However, one should always keep in mind that the purpose of “market making schemes” is to ensure sufficient and stable liquidity in financial instruments traded on a regulated market. Therefore, it would be a paradoxical and clearly unintended result, if “market making schemes” would impair or degenerate effective arrangements for liquidity provisions which are already in place. Accordingly, also the “fair and non-discriminatory” access requirement must be always seen in context and must not run contrary to the overarching goal of providing a stable liquidity framework.

Not only does Article 48(12)(f) MiFID II expressly acknowledge that there might be sound reasons not to have in place “market making schemes” at all, but also no indication can be found in the Level I text that MiFID II intends to impair the managerial decisions of regulated markets which type of market models they wish to operate, as long as the general provisions for trading venues in general and for regulated markets in particular are met. Therefore, as already mentioned in our answer to question 187 DP, it is paramount that the requirements under Article 48 MiFID II must not be interpreted in a way which would result in further restricting the diversity of market models available.

To the point that Article 48(12)(f) MiFID II explicitly alludes the possibility that a regulated market might prohibit algorithmic trading altogether, we think that such far reaching discretion must also – as it is currently the case in some markets – enclose the possibility, not to allow “shadow market making” even though, algorithmic trading per se is not prohibited in this market. Otherwise, if regulated markets would have to allow investment firms to pursue market making strategies according to Article 17(4) MiFID II as long as they allow for algorithmic trading in general, this would have the paradoxical result that MiFID II itself would create a problem which it afterwards tries to mitigate by the provisions of Article 17(3) and Article 48(2)&(3) MiFID II.

We are further of the opinion, that it is not the intention of Article 17(3) in connexion with Article 48(2)&(3) MiFID II to interfere with any existing market making arrangements (which usually go beyond the minimum market making obligations which ESMA proposes in the Discussion Paper and which regulated markets must provide for when designing a “market making scheme”). Consequently, regulated markets should be allowed to continue to enter into market making arrangements with investment firms which are tailored to the specific needs of their individual market models outside the scope of “market making schemes” for the purpose of Article 48(12)(f) MiFID II. Accordingly, regulated markets should further be able to restrict the number of investment firms, either for a specific financial instrument or globally, with whom they wish to enter into a market making arrangement which lies outside the scope of Article 48(2)(b) in connexion with 48(12)(f) MiFID II.

Such “traditional” market making arrangements are currently in place and are of fundamental importance for the functioning of price determination and the stable liquidity provision within the intermediary based market models operated by all German exchanges. – For further elaboration of this topic, please refer also to our answers given to questions 186 & 187 DP.

If however, ESMA does not share our view that regulated markets should be allowed to continue to have market maker agreements which are outside the scope of Article 48(12)(f) MiFID II (an assessment which we think would not be in line with the Level I text as demonstrated in our answer to question 268 DP), it would be of utmost importance that “discriminatory” access to market maker schemes would be allowed if the nature of the market model, respectively the price determination system employed, does not allow for more than one market maker for each financial instrument.

These intermediary based market models, whereby an investment firm is authorised for price determination in a specific security, acts as liquidity provider and has exclusive access to the order book, have been long established in Germany. They might therefore formally fall under the category of market making arrangements referred to in Paragraph 45 of Chapter 4.4 DP, where “trading venues have established technological or informational advantages for liquidity providers”. However, it needs to be

emphasised that there are effective rules, procedures and controls in place, in order to ensure that these firms which have an informational “advantages” resulting from an exclusive view into the order book they manage, cannot exploit this informational asynchrony to the disadvantage of other market participants.

In particular, investment firms acting as market makers under such arrangements are bound to the strictest neutrality and operate under a constant real time monitoring of the Trading Surveillance Office (“Handelsüberwachungsstelle” or “HüSt” for short) at the respective exchange. These Trading Surveillance Offices are given authority under public law and operate on a strictly independent basis, avoiding any potential conflict of interest between them and the market makers they supervise as well as with respect to the exchanges themselves. Therefore, from a regulatory point of view, there are no reasons not to apply this form of price determination to illiquid and liquid instruments alike. However, from an investor’s perspective, these trading model are particularly attractive for less liquid instruments as we will demonstrate below.

In practice, the mandated investment firms inform the market about the order book situation and trading interest by frequent quotation of indicative and firm quotes. Equally important, as liquidity providers, they support the market particularly in less liquid securities by increasing the marketability and negotiability of the securities and reducing the risk of costly partial executions. When executing an order in the course of self dealing, the market maker is bound by a set of rules that again commits himself to strict neutrality and prevent investors from being placed at a disadvantage by the market maker’s self dealing interests. In particular, the brokering activities must take priority and the self dealing may not have an accentuating effect on price developments. As already highlighted in our answer to question 186 DP, it must be noted that, partly as a result of the design of best execution requirements introduced with MiFID I (with the speed of execution together with the overall price being the core benchmark for best execution when executing retail orders), the importance of market making and thus self dealing activities within these systems has grown significantly during the last years.

Furthermore, there are certain aspects which make his form of price determination particularly but not solely attractive for retail investors: While in an open limit order environment the “costs” of market impact can be anticipated by investors, the attempt to drive the price of a security in a specific direction, incorporates a much higher risk when prices are determined when pre trade transparency is ensured by market maker quotes rather than by displaying individual orders.

As a result, while giving timely and accurate information on price levels, the opacity of the order book “protects” the individual orders of investors and increases their willingness to place both, orders with wider limits and market orders alike, thus ceteris paribus increasing liquidity in a specific security. Equally important, it facilitates and enhances the willingness of the assigned market maker to provide additional liquidity, since the amount of market risk he is willing to “absorb” won’t be disclosed to the market, preventing other market participants from “playing” against his account under one-directional market conditions. In this context, it is obvious that these combining effects of concentrating and enhancing liquidity require the liquidity in a given security to be bundled in a single order book. Therefore, the order book mandates are assigned by each exchange on an exclusive basis to one investment firms acting as market maker for every instrument traded under these market models.

In accordance with these characteristics, it is not surprising that academic research affirms the positive impact on price determination quality and market integrity of market models which do not provide order book access for all investors on an order by order basis. In fact, a global empirical study by Aitken/Siow (Michael Aitken, Audris Siow. Ranking World Equity Markets on the Basis of Market Efficiency and Integrity, November 2003) supports the assumption that the type of market models described above offer the comparably best protection against price manipulation since the uncertainty about the trading volume required to obtain a desired market impact detracts market participants from manipulative behaviour.

The guiding principles and the technical procedures of these market models have been already widely discussed and approved in the course of MiFID I legislation. In terms of categorisation, they are classi-

ified as “Hybrid Market Models” in accordance with Article 17(5) MiFID I Implementing Regulation with pre trade requirements being specified in Annex II, Table 1 of MiFID I Implementing Regulation.

The ongoing importance of these “hybrid” market models with market maker support can be empirically verified. According to the latest figures provided by the “Order Book Statistic German Exchanges” by Deutsche Börse, the relevant exchanges and trading segments (Berlin, Düsseldorf, “Xetra Frankfurt Spezialist”, Hamburg, Hannover, München, Stuttgart and Tradegate) account for a cumulative market share (in terms of trading volume across all instruments traded on German exchanges) of 16% for June 2014. Furthermore, since this accumulative statistic encloses all types of investors and all forms trading (including algo- and HFT-trading), it can be reasonably assumed that the relevant market share for trading undertaken by retail investors is still significantly higher.

Against this background, we emphatically urge ESMA not to impair these long time established, well accepted and regulatory sound market models by a misguided interpretation of “fair and non-discriminatory” market making schemes, designed to appropriately regulate algorithmic trading firms which in the past could pursue market making activities without any obligations solely on the basis of their own discretion.

<ESMA_QUESTION_281>

Q282: Would it be acceptable setting out any type of technological or informational advantages for participants in market making schemes for liquid instruments? If yes, please elaborate.

<ESMA_QUESTION_282>

Bundesverband der Wertpapierfirmen (bvf) comment:

As already discussed in detail in our comment to question 281 DP, in case that ESMA chooses a wide interpretation of “market making scheme” (which we think would be not in accordance with the wording and intention of the Level I text) we are of the opinion that a regulated market should be able to grant such “technological or informational advantages” – better “privileges” – as a part of their overall market making arrangements under the condition that it can demonstrate that a specific market model is in line with general requirements under MiFID II and therefore legally sound.

<ESMA_QUESTION_282>

Q283: In which cases should a market operator be entitled to close the number of firms taking part in a market making scheme?

<ESMA_QUESTION_283>

Bundesverband der Wertpapierfirmen (bvf) comment:

As already discussed in detail in our comment to question 281 DP, in case that ESMA chooses a wide interpretation of “market making scheme” (which we think would be not in accordance with the wording and intention of the Level I text) we are of the opinion that a regulated market should be able to close the number of firms taking part in a market making scheme, whereby it should be able to restrict market making activities in a specific security to a single investment firm, if the market model so requires.

<ESMA_QUESTION_283>

Q284: Do you agree that the market making requirements in Articles 17 and 48 of MiFID II are mostly relevant for liquid instruments? If not, please elaborate how you would apply the requirements in Articles 17 and 48 of MiFID II on market making schemes/agreements/strategies to illiquid instruments.

<ESMA_QUESTION_284>

Bundesverband der Wertpapierfirmen (bvf) comment:

In practice, market making activities as defined by Article 17(4) MiFID II are most relevant for high liquid instruments since “shadow market makers” can conduct their activities in these instruments at the

lowest level of risk. However, when ESMA is considering to restrict the application of market making requirements to liquid instruments only, it should take into account that it can be reasonably assume that affected firms will weigh the additional market risk they might have to absorb under a market making agreement and the market risk arising when trading instruments with lower market liquidity but retaining their full level of discretion.

In other words, regulators need to anticipate the risk that firms will try to circumvent the obligation to provide liquidity on a frequent and predictable basis by shifting their activities – at least to some degree – to less liquid market sectors. While providing liquidity to less or non-liquid instruments could be regarded as desirable in general, one must not forget that the impact of unpredicted liquidity swings in these segments could be actually even more severe.
<ESMA_QUESTION_284>

Q285: Would you support any other assessment of liquidity different to the one under Article 2(1)(17) of MiFIR? Please elaborate.

<ESMA_QUESTION_285>
Bundesverband der Wertpapierfirmen (bwf) comment:

Even though, the definitions are identical, ESMA should formally refer to the definition of “liquid markets” laid down in Article 4(25) MiFID II when drafting and developing technical standards under this directive.
<ESMA_QUESTION_285>

Q286: What should be deemed as a sufficient number of investment firms participating in a market making agreement?

<ESMA_QUESTION_286>
Bundesverband der Wertpapierfirmen (bwf) comment:

In accordance with our answer to question 283 DP and in connexion with our answer to question 281 DP, even a market maker agreement with a single investment firm should be deemed as sufficient, if it can be reasonably expected from the obligations under this agreement that sufficient liquidity is provided, taking into account the scale and frequency of trading in a specific instrument.
<ESMA_QUESTION_286>

Q287: What would be an appropriate market share for those firms participating in a market making agreement?

<ESMA_QUESTION_287>
Bundesverband der Wertpapierfirmen (bwf) comment:

The appropriate minimum market share with respect to the overall level of market making activity in a specific instrument cannot be defined without taking the residual level of liquidity in this instrument into account. While in high liquid instruments setting a threshold for appropriate market share might be dispensable, even a market share up to 100% can be appropriate in less liquid segments of the market.
<ESMA_QUESTION_287>

Q288: Do you agree that market making schemes are not required when trading in the market via a market making agreement exceeds this market share?

<ESMA_QUESTION_288>
Bundesverband der Wertpapierfirmen (bwf) comment:

In the light of the explanations given in our answers to questions 281 & 287 DP the requirement to implement a market making scheme might not only be dispensable but counterproductive under circumstances in which the operator of the regulated market already has effective procedures and arrange-

ments in place in order to insure sufficient liquidity on an ongoing and predictable basis for a specific instrument.

<ESMA_QUESTION_288>

Q289: In which cases should a market operator be entitled to close the number of firms taking part in a market making scheme?

<ESMA_QUESTION_289>

Bundesverband der Wertpapierfirmen (bvf) comment:

A market operator should be entitled to close the number of firms taking part in a market making scheme, if he can either demonstrate that he already has effective procedures and arrangements in place in order to insure sufficient liquidity on an ongoing and predictable basis for a specific instrument (which is the fundamental reasoning behind the discussed provision) or if a further increase in the number of participants would give reasonable doubt that the economic basis for pursuing a market making strategy by those already participating – taking into account the scale and frequency of trading in a specific instrument – would be undermined by further increasing the number of participants.

<ESMA_QUESTION_289>

4.5. Order-to-transaction ratio (Article 48 of MiFID II)

Q290: Do you agree with the types of messages to be taken into account by any OTR?

<ESMA_QUESTION_290>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_290>

Q291: What is your view in taking into account the value and/or volume of orders in the OTRs calculations? Please provide:

<ESMA_QUESTION_291>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_291>

Q292: Should any other additional elements be taken into account to calibrate OTRs? If yes, please provide an explanation of why these variables are important.

<ESMA_QUESTION_292>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_292>

Q293: Do you agree with the proposed scope of the OTR regime under MiFID II (liquid cash instruments traded on electronic trading systems)?

<ESMA_QUESTION_293>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_293>

Q294: Do you consider that financial instruments which reference a cash instrument(s) as underlying could be excluded from the scope of the OTR regime?

<ESMA_QUESTION_294>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_294>

Q295: Would you make any distinction between instruments which have a single instrument as underlying and those that have as underlying a basket of instruments? Please elaborate.

<ESMA_QUESTION_295>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_295>

Q296: Do you agree with considering within the scope of a future OTR regime only trading venues which have been operational for a sufficient period in the market?

<ESMA_QUESTION_296>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_296>

Q297: If yes, what would be the sufficient period for these purposes?

<ESMA_QUESTION_297>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE



<ESMA_QUESTION_297>

Q298: What is your view regarding an activity floor under which the OTR regime would not apply and where could this floor be established?

<ESMA_QUESTION_298>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_298>

Q299: Do you agree with the proposal above as regards the method of determining the OTR threshold?

<ESMA_QUESTION_299>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_299>

Q300: In particular, do you consider the approach to base the OTR regime on the 'average observed OTR of a venue' appropriate in all circumstances? If not, please elaborate.

<ESMA_QUESTION_300>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_300>

Q301: Do you believe the multiplier x should be capped at the highest member's OTR observed in the preceding period?

<ESMA_QUESTION_301>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_301>

Q302: In particular, what would be in your opinion an adequate multiplier x? Does this multiplier have to be adapted according to the (group of) instrument(s) traded? If yes, please specify in your response the financial instruments/market segments you refer to.

<ESMA_QUESTION_302>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_302>

Q303: What is your view with respect to the time intervals/frequency for the assessment and review of the OTR threshold (annually, twice a year, other)?

<ESMA_QUESTION_303>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_303>

Q304: What are your views in this regard? Please explain.

<ESMA_QUESTION_304>
Bundesverband der Wertpapierfirmen (bwf) comment:

It is widely agreed and reflected by current EU-legislation (e.g. in Recital 26 of Regulation (EU) 236/2012 on short selling and certain aspects of credit default swaps) that market makers play a fundamental role for the liquidity and efficiency of financial markets within the Union. Therefore, it should be a commonplace that they must be able to fulfil their quoting obligations and to update published quotes at a frequency which reflects the liquidity and trading activity in a particular instrument without being in danger to breach any OTR threshold.



In this context, we think that option (ii) provided in Paragraph 20 of Chapter 4.5. offers the most appropriate and practical approach as long as the exemptions and allowances to market makers and other liquidity providers will be set by the trading venues themselves.

However, if ESMA should prefer a uniform approach across all venues, than option (iii) which excludes trading activities by market makers and other liquidity providers from the OTR regime, would be deemed the best approach. Nevertheless, trading venues would be still enabled to introduce provisions within their market maker arrangements in order to limit the number of quotes published by a market maker if deemed necessary.

We are further of the opinion that market maker exemptions should be granted to all investment firms which have a binding market maker arrangement with a trading venue, no matter whether this obligation arises from Articles 17 and 48 of MiFID II or not.

<ESMA_QUESTION_304>

4.6. Co-location (Article 48(8) of MiFID II)

Q305: What factors should ESMA be considering in ensuring that co-location services are provided in a ‘transparent’, ‘fair’ and ‘non-discriminatory’ manner?

<ESMA_QUESTION_305>

TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE

<ESMA_QUESTION_305>

4.7. Fee structures (Article 48 (9) of MiFID II)

Q306: Do you agree with the approach described above?

<ESMA_QUESTION_306>

TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE

<ESMA_QUESTION_306>

Q307: Can you identify any practice that would need regulatory action in terms of transparency or predictability of trading fees?

<ESMA_QUESTION_307>

TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE

<ESMA_QUESTION_307>

Q308: Can you identify any specific difficulties in obtaining adequate information in relation to fees and rebates that would need regulatory action?

<ESMA_QUESTION_308>

TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE

<ESMA_QUESTION_308>

Q309: Can you identify cases of discriminatory access that would need regulatory action?

<ESMA_QUESTION_309>

TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE

<ESMA_QUESTION_309>



Q310: Are there other incentives and disincentives that should be considered?

<ESMA_QUESTION_310>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_310>

Q311: Do any of the parameters referred to above contribute to increasing the probability of trading behaviour that may lead to disorderly and unfair trading conditions?

<ESMA_QUESTION_311>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_311>

Q312: When designing a fee structure, is there any structure that would foster a trading behaviour leading to disorderly trading conditions? Please elaborate.

<ESMA_QUESTION_312>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_312>

Q313: Do you agree that any fee structure where, upon reaching a certain threshold of trading by a trader, a discount is applied on all his trades (including those already done) as opposed to just the marginal trade executed subsequent to reaching the threshold should be banned?

<ESMA_QUESTION_313>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_313>

Q314: Can you identify any potential risks from charging differently the submission of orders to the successive trading phases?

<ESMA_QUESTION_314>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_314>

Q315: Are there any other types of fee structures, including execution fees, ancillary fees and any rebates, that may distort competition by providing certain market participants with more favourable trading conditions than their competitors or pose a risk to orderly trading and that should be considered here?

<ESMA_QUESTION_315>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_315>

Q316: Are there any discount structures which might lead to a situation where the trading cost is borne disproportionately by certain trading participants?

<ESMA_QUESTION_316>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_316>

Q317: For trading venues charging different trading fees for participation in different trading phases (i.e. different fees for opening and closing auctions versus continuous trading period), might this lead to disorderly trading and if so, under which circumstances would such conditions occur?



<ESMA_QUESTION_317>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_317>

Q318: Should conformance testing be charged?

<ESMA_QUESTION_318>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_318>

Q319: Should testing of algorithms in relation to the creation or contribution of disorderly markets be charged?

<ESMA_QUESTION_319>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_319>

Q320: Do you envisage any scenario where charging for conformance testing and/or testing in relation to disorderly trading conditions might discourage firms from investing sufficiently in testing their algorithms?

<ESMA_QUESTION_320>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_320>

Q321: Do you agree with the approach described above?

<ESMA_QUESTION_321>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_321>

Q322: How could the principles described above be further clarified?

<ESMA_QUESTION_322>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_322>

Q323: Do you agree that and OTR must be complemented with a penalty fee?

<ESMA_QUESTION_323>
Bundesverband der Wertpapierfirmen (bwf) comment:

We are not happy with the word “penalty fee” in this context and would prefer a more neutral wording, e.g. “excessive usage fee”. However, we agree that such a fee should create effective economic incentives to avoid overcharging trading- and messaging systems by immoderate OTRs.

<ESMA_QUESTION_323>

Q324: In terms of the approach to determine the penalty fee for breaching the OTR, which approach would you prefer? If neither of them are satisfactory for you, please elaborate what alternative you would envisage.

<ESMA_QUESTION_324>
Bundesverband der Wertpapierfirmen (bwf) comment:

Thresholds for OTR should be calibrated in a way which takes the individual technical capacity of a trading venue into account. We think that this responsibility for doing so and for implementing an effective OTR policy should stay with each trading venue. However, trading venues should be obliged to



inform the public about their OTR policies and its technological assessment on which the policies are based in sufficient detail.

<ESMA_QUESTION_324>

Q325: Do you agree that the observation period should be the same as the billing period?

<ESMA_QUESTION_325>

TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE

<ESMA_QUESTION_325>

Q326: Would you apply economic penalties only when the OTR is systematically breached? If yes, how would you define “systematic breaches of the OTR”?

<ESMA_QUESTION_326>

TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE

<ESMA_QUESTION_326>

Q327: Do you consider that market makers should have a less stringent approach in terms of penalties for breaching the OTR?

<ESMA_QUESTION_327>

TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE

<ESMA_QUESTION_327>

Q328: Please indicate which fee structure could incentivise abusive trading behaviour.

<ESMA_QUESTION_328>

TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE

<ESMA_QUESTION_328>

Q329: In your opinion, are there any current fee structures providing these types of incentives? Please elaborate.

<ESMA_QUESTION_329>

TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE

<ESMA_QUESTION_329>

4.8. Tick sizes (Article 48(6) and Article 49 of MiFID II)

Q330: Do you agree with the general approach ESMA has suggested?

<ESMA_QUESTION_330>

TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE

<ESMA_QUESTION_330>

Q331: Do you agree with adopting the average number of daily trades as an indicator for liquidity to satisfy the liquidity requirement of Article 49 of MiFID II? Are there any other methods/liquidity proxies that allow comparable granularity and that should be considered?

<ESMA_QUESTION_331>

TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE

<ESMA_QUESTION_331>

Q332: In your view, what granularity should be used to determine the liquidity profile of financial instruments? As a result, what would be a proper number of liquidity bands?

<ESMA_QUESTION_332>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_332>

Q333: What is your view on defining the trade-off between constraining the spread without increasing viscosity too much on the basis of a floor-ceiling mechanism?

<ESMA_QUESTION_333>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_333>

Q334: What do you think of the proposed spread to tick ratio range?

<ESMA_QUESTION_334>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_334>

Q335: In your view, for the tick size regime to be efficient and appropriate, should it rely on the spread to tick ratio range, the evolution of liquidity bands, a combination of the two or none of the above?

<ESMA_QUESTION_335>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_335>

Q336: What is your view regarding the common tick size table proposed under Option 1? Do you consider it easy to read, implement and monitor? Does the proposed two dimensional tick size table (based on both the liquidity profile and price) allow applying a tick size to a homogeneous class of stocks given its clear-cut price and liquidity classes?

<ESMA_QUESTION_336>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_336>

Q337: What is your view regarding the determination of the liquidity and price classes?

<ESMA_QUESTION_337>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_337>

Q338: Considering that market microstructure may evolve, would you favour a regime that allows further calibration of the tick size on the basis of the observed market microstructure?

<ESMA_QUESTION_338>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_338>

Q339: In your view, does the tick size regime proposed under Option 1 offer sufficient predictability and certainty to market participants in a context where markets are constantly evolving (notably given its calibration and monitoring mechanisms)?

<ESMA_QUESTION_339>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE



<ESMA_QUESTION_339>

Q340: The common tick size table proposed under Option 1 provides for re-calibration while constantly maintaining a control sample. In your view, what frequency would be appropriate for the revision of the figures (e.g., yearly)?

<ESMA_QUESTION_340>

TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE

<ESMA_QUESTION_340>

Q341: In your view, what is the impact of Option 1 on the activity of market participants, including trading venue operators? To what extent, would it require adjustments?

<ESMA_QUESTION_341>

TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE

<ESMA_QUESTION_341>

Q342: Do you agree that some equity-like instruments require an equivalent regulation of tick sizes as equities so as to ensure the orderly functioning of markets and to avoid the migration of trading across instrument types based on tick size? If not, please outline why this would not be the case.

<ESMA_QUESTION_342>

TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE

<ESMA_QUESTION_342>

Q343: Are there any other similar equity-like instruments that should be added / removed from the scope of tick size regulation? Please outline the reasons why such instruments should be added / removed?

<ESMA_QUESTION_343>

TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE

<ESMA_QUESTION_343>

Q344: Do you agree that depositary receipts require the same tick size regime as equities'?

<ESMA_QUESTION_344>

TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE

<ESMA_QUESTION_344>

Q345: If you think that for certain equity-like instruments (e.g. ETFs) the spread-based tick size regime¹ would be more appropriate, please specify your reasons and provide a detailed description of the methodology and technical specifications of this alternative concept.

<ESMA_QUESTION_345>

TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE

<ESMA_QUESTION_345>

¹ Please see the description of Option 2 regarding tick sizes below.

Q346: If you generally (also for liquid and illiquid shares as well as other equity-like financial instruments) prefer a spread-based tick size regime² vis-à-vis the regime as proposed under Option 1 and tested by ESMA, please specify the reasons and provide the following information:

<ESMA_QUESTION_346>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_346>

Q347: Given the different tick sizes currently in operation, please explain what your preferred type of tick size regulation would be, giving reasons why this is the case.

<ESMA_QUESTION_347>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_347>

Q348: Do you see a need to develop a tick size regime for any non-equity financial instrument? If yes, please elaborate, indicating in particular which approach you would follow to determine that regime.

<ESMA_QUESTION_348>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_348>

Q349: Do you agree with assessing the liquidity of a share for the purposes of the tick size regime, using the rule described above? If not, please elaborate what criteria you would apply to distinguish between liquid and illiquid instruments.

<ESMA_QUESTION_349>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_349>

Q350: Do you agree with the tick sizes proposed under Option 2? In particular, should a different tick size be used for the largest band, taking into account the size of the tick relative to the price? Please elaborate.

<ESMA_QUESTION_350>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_350>

Q351: Should the tick size be calibrated in a more granular manner to that proposed above, namely by shifting a band which results in a large step-wise change?

<ESMA_QUESTION_351>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_351>

Q352: Do you agree with the above treatment for a newly admitted instrument? Would this affect the subsequent trading in a negative way?

<ESMA_QUESTION_352>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE

² Please see the description of Option 2 regarding tick sizes below.



<ESMA_QUESTION_352>

Q353: Do you agree that a period of six weeks is appropriate for the purpose of initial calibration for all instruments admitted to the pan-European tick size regime under Option 2? If not, what would be the appropriate period for the initial calibration?

<ESMA_QUESTION_353>

TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE

<ESMA_QUESTION_353>

Q354: Do you agree with the proposal of factoring the bid-ask spread into tick size regime through SAF? If not, what would you consider as the appropriate method?

<ESMA_QUESTION_354>

TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE

<ESMA_QUESTION_354>

Q355: Do you agree with the proposal to take an average bid-ask spread of less than two ticks as being too narrow? If not, what level of spread to ticks would you consider to be too narrow?

<ESMA_QUESTION_355>

TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE

<ESMA_QUESTION_355>

Q356: Under the current proposal, it is not considered necessary to set an upper ceiling to the bid-ask spread, as the preliminary view under Option 2 is that under normal conditions the risk of the spread widening indefinitely is limited (and in any event a regulator may amend SAF manually if required). Do you agree with this view? If not, how would you propose to set an upper ceiling applicable across markets in the EU?

<ESMA_QUESTION_356>

TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE

<ESMA_QUESTION_356>

Q357: Do you have any concerns of a possible disruption which may materialise in implementing a review cycle as envisioned above?

<ESMA_QUESTION_357>

TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE

<ESMA_QUESTION_357>

Q358: Do you agree that illiquid instruments, excluding illiquid cash equities, should be excluded from the scope of a pan-European tick size regime under Option 2 until such time that definitions for these instruments become available? If not, please explain why. If there are any equity-like instruments per Article 49(3) of MiFID II that you feel should be included in the pan-European tick size regime at the same time as for cash equities, please list these instruments together with a brief reason for doing so.

<ESMA_QUESTION_358>

TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE

<ESMA_QUESTION_358>



Q359: Do you agree that financial instruments, other than those listed in Article 49(3) of MiFID II should be excluded from the scope of the pan-European tick size regime under Option 2 at least for the time being? If not, please explain why and which specific instruments do you consider necessary to be included in the regime.

<ESMA_QUESTION_359>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_359>

Q360: What views do you have on whether tick sizes should be revised on a dynamic or periodic basis? What role do you perceive for an automated mechanism for doing this versus review by the NCA responsible for the instrument in question? If you prefer periodic review, how frequently should reviews be undertaken (e.g. quarterly, annually)?

<ESMA_QUESTION_360>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_360>



5. Data publication and access

5.1. General authorisation and organisational requirements for data reporting services (Article 61(4), MiFID II)

Q361: Do you agree that the guidance produced by CESR in 2010 is broadly appropriate for all three types of DRS providers?

<ESMA_QUESTION_361>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_361>

Q362: Do you agree that there should also be a requirement for notification of significant system changes?

<ESMA_QUESTION_362>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_362>

Q363: Are there any other general elements that should be considered in the NCAs' assessment of whether to authorise a DRS provider?

<ESMA_QUESTION_363>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_363>

5.2. Additional requirements for particular types of Data Reporting Services Providers

Q364: Do you agree with the identified differences regarding the regulatory treatment of ARMs.

<ESMA_QUESTION_364>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_364>

Q365: What other significant differences will there have to be in the standards for APAs, CTPs and ARMs?

<ESMA_QUESTION_365>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_365>

5.3. Technical arrangements promoting an efficient and consistent dissemination of information – Machine readability Article 64(6), MiFID II



Q366: Do you agree with the proposal to define machine-readability in this way? If not, what would you prefer?

<ESMA_QUESTION_366>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_366>

5.4. Consolidated tape providers

Q367: Should the tapes be offered to users on an instrument-by-instrument basis, or as a single comprehensive tape, or at some intermediate level of disaggregation? Do you think that transparency information should be available without the need for value-added products to be purchased alongside?

<ESMA_QUESTION_367>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_367>

Q368: Are there other factors or considerations regarding data publication by the CTP that are not covered in the standards for data publication by APAs and trading venues and that should be taken into account by ESMA?

<ESMA_QUESTION_368>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_368>

Q369: Do you agree that CTPs should be able to provide the services listed above? Are there any others that you think should be specified?

<ESMA_QUESTION_369>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_369>

5.5. Data disaggregation

Q370: Do you agree that venues should not be required to disaggregate by individual instrument?

<ESMA_QUESTION_370>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_370>

Q371: Do you agree that venues should be obliged to disaggregate their pre-trade and post-trade data by asset class?

<ESMA_QUESTION_371>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_371>

Q372: Do you believe the list of asset classes proposed in the previous paragraph is appropriate for this purpose? If not, what would you propose?



<ESMA_QUESTION_372>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_372>

Q373: Do you agree that venues should be under an obligation to disaggregate according to the listed criteria unless they can demonstrate that there is insufficient customer interest?

<ESMA_QUESTION_373>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_373>

Q374: Are there any other criteria according to which it would be useful for venues to disaggregate their data, and if so do you think there should be a mandatory or comply-or-explain requirement for them to do so?

<ESMA_QUESTION_374>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_374>

Q375: What impact do you think greater disaggregation will have in practice for overall costs faced by customers?

<ESMA_QUESTION_375>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_375>

5.6. Identification of the investment firm responsible for making public the volume and price transparency of a transaction (Articles 20(3) (c) and 21(5)(c), MiFIR)

Q376: Please describe your views about how to improve the current trade reporting system under Article 27(4) of MiFID Implementing Regulation.

<ESMA_QUESTION_376>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_376>

5.7. Access to CCPs and trading venues (Articles 35-36, MiFIR)

Q377: Do you agree that exceeding the planned capacity of the CCP is grounds to deny access?

<ESMA_QUESTION_377>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_377>

Q378: How would a CCP assess that the anticipated volume of transactions would exceed its capacity planning?

<ESMA_QUESTION_378>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE



<ESMA_QUESTION_378>

Q379: Are there other risks related to the anticipated volume of transactions that should be considered? If so, how would such risks arise from the provision of access?

<ESMA_QUESTION_379>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_379>

Q380: Do you agree that exceeding the planned capacity of the CCP is grounds to deny access?

<ESMA_QUESTION_380>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_380>

Q381: How would a CCP assess that the number of users expected to access its systems would exceed its capacity planning?

<ESMA_QUESTION_381>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_381>

Q382: Are there other risks related to number of users that should be considered? If so, how would such risks arise from the provision of access?

<ESMA_QUESTION_382>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_382>

Q383: In what way could granting access to a trading venue expose a CCP to risks associated with a change in the type of users accessing the CCP? Are there any additional risks that could be relevant in this situation?

<ESMA_QUESTION_383>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_383>

Q384: How would a CCP establish that the anticipated operational risk would exceed its operational risk management design?

<ESMA_QUESTION_384>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_384>

Q385: Are there other risks related to arrangements for managing operational risk that should be considered? If so, how would such risks arise from the provision of access?

<ESMA_QUESTION_385>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_385>

Q386: Given there will be costs to meeting an access request, what regard should be given to those costs that would create significant undue risk?

<ESMA_QUESTION_386>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE



<ESMA_QUESTION_386>

Q387: To what extent could a lack of harmonization in certain areas of law constitute a relevant risk in the context of granting or denying access?

<ESMA_QUESTION_387>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_387>

Q388: Do you agree with the risks identified above in relation to complexity and other factors creating significant undue risks?

<ESMA_QUESTION_388>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_388>

Q389: Q: Are there other risks related to complexity and other factors creating significant undue risks that should be considered? If so, how would such risks arise from the provision of access?

<ESMA_QUESTION_389>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_389>

Q390: Do you agree with the analysis above and the conclusion specified in the previous paragraph?

<ESMA_QUESTION_390>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_390>

Q391: To what extent would a trading venue granting access give rise to material risks because of anticipated volume of transactions and the number of users? Can you evidence that access will materially change volumes and the number of users?

<ESMA_QUESTION_391>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_391>

Q392: To what extent would a trading venue granting access give rise to material risks because of arrangements for managing operational risk?

<ESMA_QUESTION_392>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_392>

Q393: Given there will be costs to meeting an access request, what regard should be given to those costs that would create significant undue risk?

<ESMA_QUESTION_393>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_393>

Q394: Do you believe a CCP's model regarding the acceptance of trades may create risks to a trading venue if access is provided? If so, please explain in which cases and how.

<ESMA_QUESTION_394>



TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_394>

Q395: Could granting access create unmanageable risks for trading venues due to conflicts of law arising from the involvement of different legal regimes?

<ESMA_QUESTION_395>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_395>

Q396: Are there other risks related to complexity and other factors creating significant undue risks that should be considered? If so, how would such risks arise from the provision of access?

<ESMA_QUESTION_396>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_396>

Q397: Do you agree with the conditions set out above? If you do not, please state why not.

<ESMA_QUESTION_397>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_397>

Q398: Are there any other conditions CCPs and trading venues should include in their terms for agreeing access?

<ESMA_QUESTION_398>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_398>

Q399: Are there any other fees that are relevant in the context of Articles 35 and 36 of MiFIR that should be analysed?

<ESMA_QUESTION_399>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_399>

Q400: Are there other considerations that need to be made in respect of transparent and non-discriminatory fees?

<ESMA_QUESTION_400>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_400>

Q401: Do you consider that the proposed approach adequately reflects the need to ensure that the CCP does not apply discriminatory collateral requirements? What alternative approach would you consider?

<ESMA_QUESTION_401>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_401>

Q402: Do you see other conditions under which netting of economically equivalent contracts would be enforceable and ensure non-discriminatory treatment for the prospective trading venue in line with all the conditions of Article 35(1)(a)?



<ESMA_QUESTION_402>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_402>

Q403: The approach above relies on the CCP's model compliance with Article 27 of Regulation (EU) No 153/2013, do you see any other circumstances for a CCP to cross margin correlated contracts? Do you see other conditions under which cross margining of correlated contracts would be enforceable and ensure non-discriminatory treatment for the prospective trading venue?

<ESMA_QUESTION_403>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_403>

Q404: Do you agree with ESMA that the two considerations that could justify a national competent authority in denying access are (a) knowledge it has about the trading venue or CCP being at risk of not meeting its legal obligations, and (b) liquidity fragmentation? If not, please explain why.

<ESMA_QUESTION_404>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_404>

Q405: How could the above mentioned considerations be further specified?

<ESMA_QUESTION_405>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_405>

Q406: Are there other conditions that may threaten the smooth and orderly functioning of the markets or adversely affect systemic risk? If so, how would such risks arise from the provision of access?

<ESMA_QUESTION_406>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_406>

Q407: Do you agree with ESMA's proposed approach that where there are equally accepted alternative approaches to calculating notional amount, but there are notable differences in the value to which these calculation methods give rise, ESMA should specify the method that should be used?

<ESMA_QUESTION_407>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_407>

Q408: Do you agree that the examples provided above are appropriate for ESMA to adopt given the purpose for which the opt-out mechanism was introduced? If not, why, and what alternative(s) would you propose?

<ESMA_QUESTION_408>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_408>



Q409: For which types of exchange traded derivative instruments do you consider there to be notable differences in the way the notional amount is calculated? How should the notional amount for these particular instruments be calculated?

<ESMA_QUESTION_409>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_409>

Q410: Are there any other considerations ESMA should take into account when further specifying how notional amount should be calculated? In particular, how should technical transactions be treated for the purposes of Article 36(5), MiFIR?

<ESMA_QUESTION_410>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_410>

5.8. Non- discriminatory access to and obligation to license benchmarks

Q411: Do you agree that trading venues require the relevant information mentioned above? If not, why?

<ESMA_QUESTION_411>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_411>

Q412: Is there any other additional information in respect of price and data feeds that a trading venue would need for the purposes of trading?

<ESMA_QUESTION_412>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_412>

Q413: Do you agree that CCPs require the relevant information mentioned above? If not, why?

<ESMA_QUESTION_413>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_413>

Q414: Is there any other additional information in respect of price and data feeds that a CCP would need for the purposes of clearing?

<ESMA_QUESTION_414>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_414>

Q415: Do you agree that trading venues should have access to benchmark values as soon as they are calculated? If not, why?

<ESMA_QUESTION_415>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_415>



Q416: Do you agree that CCPs should have access to benchmark values as soon as they are calculated? If not, why?

<ESMA_QUESTION_416>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_416>

Q417: Do you agree that trading venues require the relevant information mentioned above? If not, why?

<ESMA_QUESTION_417>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_417>

Q418: Is there any other additional information in respect of composition that a trading venue would need for the purposes of trading?

<ESMA_QUESTION_418>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_418>

Q419: Do you agree that CCPs require the relevant information mentioned above? If not, why?

<ESMA_QUESTION_419>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_419>

Q420: Is there any other additional information in respect of composition that a CCP would need for the purposes of clearing?

<ESMA_QUESTION_420>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_420>

Q421: Do you agree that trading venues and CCPs should be notified of any planned changes to the composition of the benchmark in advance? And that where this is not possible, notification should be given as soon as the change is made? If not, why?

<ESMA_QUESTION_421>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_421>

Q422: Do you agree that trading venues need the relevant information mentioned above? If not, why?

<ESMA_QUESTION_422>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_422>

Q423: Is there any other additional information in respect of methodology that a trading venue would need for the purposes of trading?

<ESMA_QUESTION_423>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_423>



Q424: Do you agree that CCPs require the relevant information mentioned above? If not, why?

<ESMA_QUESTION_424>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_424>

Q425: Is there any other additional information in respect of methodology that a CCP would need for the purposes of clearing?

<ESMA_QUESTION_425>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_425>

Q426: Is there any information in respect of the methodology of a benchmark that a person with proprietary rights to a benchmark should not be required to provide to a trading venue or a CCP?

<ESMA_QUESTION_426>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_426>

Q427: Do you agree that trading venues require the relevant information mentioned above (values, types and sources of inputs, used to develop benchmark values)? If not, why?

<ESMA_QUESTION_427>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_427>

Q428: Is there any other additional information in respect of pricing that a trading venue would need for the purposes of trading?

<ESMA_QUESTION_428>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_428>

Q429: In what other circumstances should a trading venue not be able to require the values of the constituents of a benchmark?

<ESMA_QUESTION_429>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_429>

Q430: Do you agree that CCPs require the relevant information mentioned above? If not, why?

<ESMA_QUESTION_430>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_430>

Q431: Is there any other additional information in respect of pricing that a CCP would need for the purposes of clearing?

<ESMA_QUESTION_431>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_431>



Q432: In what other circumstances should a CCP not be able to require the values of the constituents of a benchmark?

<ESMA_QUESTION_432>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_432>

Q433: Do you agree that trading venues require the additional information mentioned above? If not, why?

<ESMA_QUESTION_433>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_433>

Q434: Do you agree that CCPs require the additional information mentioned above? If not, why?

<ESMA_QUESTION_434>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_434>

Q435: Is there any other information that a trading venue would need for the purposes of trading?

<ESMA_QUESTION_435>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_435>

Q436: Is there any other information that a CCP would need for the purposes of clearing?

<ESMA_QUESTION_436>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_436>

Q437: Do you agree with the principles described above? If not, why?

<ESMA_QUESTION_437>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_437>

Q438: Do users of trading venues need non-publicly disclosed information on benchmarks?

<ESMA_QUESTION_438>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_438>

Q439: Do users of CCPs need non-publicly disclosed information on benchmarks?

<ESMA_QUESTION_439>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_439>

Q440: Where information is not available publicly should users be provided with the relevant information through agreements with the person with proprietary rights to the benchmark or with its trading venue / CCP?

<ESMA_QUESTION_440>



TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_440>

Q441: Do you agree with the conditions set out above? If not, please state why not.

<ESMA_QUESTION_441>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_441>

Q442: Are there any other conditions persons with proprietary rights to a benchmark and trading venues should include in their terms for agreeing access?

<ESMA_QUESTION_442>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_442>

Q443: Are there any other conditions persons with proprietary rights to a benchmark and CCPs should include in their terms for agreeing access?

<ESMA_QUESTION_443>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_443>

Q444: Which specific terms/conditions currently included in licensing agreements might be discriminatory/give rise to preventing access?

<ESMA_QUESTION_444>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_444>

Q445: Do you have views on how termination should be handled in relation to outstanding/significant cases of breach?

<ESMA_QUESTION_445>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_445>

Q446: Do you agree with the approach ESMA has taken regarding the assessment of a benchmark's novelty, i.e., to balance/weight certain factors against one another? If not, how do you think the assessment should be carried out?

<ESMA_QUESTION_446>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_446>

Q447: Do you agree that each newly released series of a benchmark should not be considered a new benchmark?

<ESMA_QUESTION_447>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_447>

Q448: Do you agree that the factors mentioned above could be considered when assessing whether a benchmark is new? If not, why?

<ESMA_QUESTION_448>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE



<ESMA_QUESTION_448>

Q449: Are there any factors that would determine that a benchmark is not new?

<ESMA_QUESTION_449>

TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE

<ESMA_QUESTION_449>



6. Requirements applying on and to trading venues

6.1. Admission to Trading

Q450: What are your views regarding the conditions that have to be satisfied in order for a financial instrument to be admitted to trading?

<ESMA_QUESTION_450>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_450>

Q451: In your experience, do you consider that the requirements being in place since 2007 have worked satisfactorily or do they require updating? If the latter, which additional requirements should be imposed?

<ESMA_QUESTION_451>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_451>

Q452: More specifically, do you think that the requirements for transferable securities, units in collective investment undertakings and/or derivatives need to be amended or updated? What is your proposal?

<ESMA_QUESTION_452>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_452>

Q453: How do you assess the proposal in respect of requiring ETFs to offer market making arrangements and direct redemption facilities at least in cases where the regulated market value of units or shares significantly varies from the net asset value?

<ESMA_QUESTION_453>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_453>

Q454: Which arrangements are currently in place at European markets to verify compliance of issuers with initial, on-going and ad hoc disclosure obligations?

<ESMA_QUESTION_454>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_454>

Q455: What are your experiences in respect of such arrangements?

<ESMA_QUESTION_455>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_455>

Q456: What is your view on how effective these arrangements are in performing verification checks?

<ESMA_QUESTION_456>



TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_456>

Q457: What arrangements are currently in place on European regulated markets to facilitate access of members or participants to information being made public under Union law?

<ESMA_QUESTION_457>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_457>

Q458: What are your experiences in respect of such arrangements?

<ESMA_QUESTION_458>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_458>

Q459: How do you assess the effectiveness of these arrangements in achieving their goals?

<ESMA_QUESTION_459>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_459>

Q460: Do you agree with that, for the purpose of Article 51 (3) (2) of MiFID II, the arrangements for facilitating access to information shall encompass the Prospectus, Transparency and Market Abuse Directives (in the future the Market Abuse Regulation)? Do you consider that this should also include MiFIR trade transparency obligations?

<ESMA_QUESTION_460>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_460>

6.2. Suspension and Removal of Financial Instruments from Trading - connection between a derivative and the underlying financial instrument and standards for determining formats and timings of communications and publications

Q461: Do you agree with the specifications outlined above for the suspension or removal from trading of derivatives which are related to financial instruments that are suspended or removed?

<ESMA_QUESTION_461>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_461>

Q462: Do you think that any derivatives with indices or a basket of financial instruments as an underlying the pricing of which depends on multiple price inputs should be suspended if one or more of the instruments composing the index or the basket are suspended on the basis that they are sufficiently related? If so, what methodology would you propose for determining whether they are “sufficiently related”? Please explain.

<ESMA_QUESTION_462>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_462>



Q463: Do you agree with the principles outlined above for the timing and format of communications and publications to be effected by trading venue operators?

<ESMA_QUESTION_463>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_463>

7. Commodity derivatives

7.1. Ancillary Activity

Q464: Do you see any difficulties in defining the term ‘group’ as proposed above?

<ESMA_QUESTION_464>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_464>

Q465: What are the advantages and disadvantages of the two alternative approaches mentioned above (taking into account non-EU activities versus taking into account only EU activities of a group)? Please provide reasons for your answer.

<ESMA_QUESTION_465>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_465>

Q466: What are the main challenges in relation to both approaches and how could they be addressed?

<ESMA_QUESTION_466>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_466>

Q467: Do you consider there are any difficulties concerning the suggested approach for assessing whether the ancillary activities constitute a minority of activities at group level? Do you consider that the proposed calculations appropriately factor in activity which is subject to the permitted exemptions under Article 2(4) MiFID II? If no, please explain why and provide an alternative proposal.

<ESMA_QUESTION_467>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_467>

Q468: Are there other approaches for assessing whether the ancillary activities constitute a minority of activities at group level that you would like to suggest? Please provide details and reasons.

<ESMA_QUESTION_468>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_468>

Q469: How should “minority of activities” be defined? Should minority be less than 50% or less (50 - x)%? Please provide reasons.

<ESMA_QUESTION_469>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_469>



Q470: Do you have a view on whether economic or accounting capital should be used in order to define the elements triggering the exemption from authorisation under MiFID II, available under Article 2(1)(j)? Please provide reasons.

<ESMA_QUESTION_470>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_470>

Q471: If economic capital were to be used as a measure, what do you understand to be encompassed by this term?

<ESMA_QUESTION_471>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_471>

Q472: Do you agree with the above assessment that the data available in the TRs will enable entities to perform the necessary calculations?

<ESMA_QUESTION_472>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_472>

Q473: What difficulties do you consider entities may encounter in obtaining the information that is necessary to define the size of their own trading activity and the size of the overall market trading activity from TRs? How could the identified difficulties be addressed?

<ESMA_QUESTION_473>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_473>

Q474: What do you consider to be the difficulties in defining the volume of the transactions entered into to fulfil liquidity obligations?

<ESMA_QUESTION_474>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_474>

Q475: How should the volume of the overall trading activity of the firm at group level and the volume of the transactions entered into in order to hedge physical activities be measured? (Number of contracts or nominal value? Period of time to be considered?)

<ESMA_QUESTION_475>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_475>

Q476: Do you agree with the level of granularity of asset classes suggested in order to provide for relative comparison between market participants?

<ESMA_QUESTION_476>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_476>

Q477: What difficulties could there be regarding the aggregation of TR data in order to obtain information on the size of the overall market trading activity? How could these difficulties be addressed?



<ESMA_QUESTION_477>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_477>

Q478: How should ESMA set the threshold above which persons fall within MiFID II's scope? At what percentage should the threshold be set? Please provide reasons for your response.

<ESMA_QUESTION_478>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_478>

Q479: Are there other approaches for determining the size of the trading activity that you would like to suggest?

<ESMA_QUESTION_479>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_479>

Q480: Are there other elements apart from the need for ancillary activities to constitute a minority of activities and the comparison between the size of the trading activity and size of the overall market trading activity that ESMA should take into account when defining whether an activity is ancillary to the main business?

<ESMA_QUESTION_480>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_480>

Q481: Do you see any difficulties with the interpretation of the hedging exemptions mentioned above under Article 2(4)(a) and (c) of MiFID II? How could potential difficulties be addressed?

<ESMA_QUESTION_481>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_481>

Q482: Do you agree with ESMA's proposal to take into account Article 10 of the Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 149/2013 supplementing EMIR in specifying the application of the hedging exemption under Article 2(4)(b) of MiFID II? How could any potential difficulties be addressed?

<ESMA_QUESTION_482>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_482>

Q483: Do you agree that the obligations to provide liquidity under Article 17(3) and Article 57(8)(d) of MiFID II should not be taken into account as an obligation triggering the hedging exemption mentioned above under Article 2(4)(c)?

<ESMA_QUESTION_483>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_483>

Q484: Could you provide any other specific examples of obligations of "transactions in commodity derivatives and emission allowances entered into to fulfil obligations to provide liquidity on a trading venue" which ESMA should take into account?



<ESMA_QUESTION_484>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_484>

Q485: Should the (timeframe for) assessment be linked to audit processes?

<ESMA_QUESTION_485>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_485>

Q486: How should seasonal variations be taken into account (for instance, if a firm puts on a maximum position at one point in the year and sells that down through the following twelve months should the calculation be taken at the maximum point or on average)?

<ESMA_QUESTION_486>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_486>

Q487: Which approach would be practical in relation to firms that may fall within the scope of MiFID in one year but qualify for exemption in another year?

<ESMA_QUESTION_487>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_487>

Q488: Do you see difficulties with regard to the two approaches suggested above?

<ESMA_QUESTION_488>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_488>

Q489: How could a possible interim approach be defined with regard to the suggestion mentioned above (i.e. annual notification but calculation on a three years rolling basis)?

<ESMA_QUESTION_489>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_489>

Q490: Do you agree that the competent authority to which the notification has to be made should be the one of the place of incorporation?

<ESMA_QUESTION_490>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_490>

7.2. Position Limits

Q491: Do you agree with ESMA's proposal to link the definition of a risk-reducing trade under MiFID II to the definition applicable under EMIR? If you do not agree, what alternative definition do you believe is appropriate?

<ESMA_QUESTION_491>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_491>



Q492: Do you agree with ESMA’s proposed definition of a non-financial entity? If you do not agree, what alternative definition do you believe is appropriate?

<ESMA_QUESTION_492>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_492>

Q493: Should the regime for subsidiaries of a person other than entities that are wholly owned look to aggregate on the basis of a discrete percentage threshold or on a more subjective basis? What are the advantages and risks of either approach? Do you agree with the proposal that where the positions of an entity that is subject to substantial control by a person are aggregated, they are included in their entirety?

<ESMA_QUESTION_493>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_493>

Q494: Should the regime apply to the positions held by unconnected persons where they are acting together with a common purpose (for example, “concert party” arrangements where different market participants collude to act for common purpose)?

<ESMA_QUESTION_494>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_494>

Q495: Do you agree with the approach to link the definition of economically equivalent OTC contract, for the purpose of position limits, with the definitions used in other parts of MiFID II? If you do not agree, what alternative definition do you believe is appropriate?

<ESMA_QUESTION_495>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_495>

Q496: Do you agree that even where a contract is, or may be, cash-settled it is appropriate to base its equivalence on the substitutability of the underlying physical commodity that it is referenced to? If you do not agree, what alternative measures of equivalence could be used?

<ESMA_QUESTION_496>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_496>

Q497: Do you believe that the definition of “economically equivalent” that is used by the CFTC is appropriate for the purpose of defining the contracts that are not traded on a trading venue for the position limits regime of MiFID II? Give reasons to support your views as well as any suggested amendments or additions to this definition.

<ESMA_QUESTION_497>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_497>

Q498: What arrangements could be put in place to support competent authorities identifying what OTC contracts are considered to be economically equivalent to listed contracts traded on a trading venue? ?

<ESMA_QUESTION_498>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE



<ESMA_QUESTION_498>

Q499: Do you agree with ESMA’s proposal that the “same” derivative contract occurs where an identical contract is listed independently on two or more different trading venues? What other alternative definitions of “same” could be applied to commodity derivatives?

<ESMA_QUESTION_499>

TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE

<ESMA_QUESTION_499>

Q500: Do you agree with ESMA’s proposals on aggregation and netting? How should ESMA address the practical obstacles to including within the assessment positions entered into OTC or on third country venues? Should ESMA adopt a model for pooling related contracts and should this extend to closely correlated contracts? How should equivalent contracts be converted into a similar metric to the exchange traded contract they are deemed equivalent to?

<ESMA_QUESTION_500>

TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE

<ESMA_QUESTION_500>

Q501: Do you agree with ESMA’s approach to defining market size for physically settled contracts? Is it appropriate for cash settled contracts to set position limits without taking into account the underlying physical market?

<ESMA_QUESTION_501>

TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE

<ESMA_QUESTION_501>

Q502: Do you agree that it is preferable to set the position limit on a contract for a fixed (excluding exceptional circumstances) period rather than amending it on a real-time basis? What period do you believe is appropriate, considering in particular the factors of market evolution and operational efficiency?

<ESMA_QUESTION_502>

TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE

<ESMA_QUESTION_502>

Q503: Once the position limits regime is implemented, what period do you feel is appropriate to give sufficient notice to persons of the subsequent adjustment of position limits?

<ESMA_QUESTION_503>

TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE

<ESMA_QUESTION_503>

Q504: Should positions based on contracts entered into before the revision of position limits be grandfathered and if so how?

<ESMA_QUESTION_504>

TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE

<ESMA_QUESTION_504>

Q505: Do you agree with ESMA’s proposals for the determination of a central or primary trading venue for the purpose of establishing position limits in the same derivative contracts? If you do not agree, what practical alternative method should be used?



<ESMA_QUESTION_505>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_505>

Q506: Should the level of “significant volume” be set at a different level to that proposed above? If yes, please explain what level should be applied, and how it may be determined on an ongoing basis?

<ESMA_QUESTION_506>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_506>

Q507: In using the maturity of commodity contracts as a factor, do you agree that competent authorities apply the methodology in a different way for the spot month and for the aggregate of all other months along the curve?

<ESMA_QUESTION_507>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_507>

Q508: What factors do you believe should be applied to reflect the differences in the nature of trading activity between the spot month and the forward months?

<ESMA_QUESTION_508>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_508>

Q509: Do you agree with ESMA’s proposal for trading venues to provide data on the deliverable supply underlying their contracts? If you do not agree, what considerations should be given to determining the deliverable supply for a contract?

<ESMA_QUESTION_509>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_509>

Q510: In the light of the fact that some commodity markets are truly global, do you consider that open interest in similar or identical contracts in non-EEA jurisdictions should be taken into account? If so, how do you propose doing this, given that data from some trading venues may not be available on the same basis or in the same timeframe as that from other trading venues?

<ESMA_QUESTION_510>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_510>

Q511: In the absence of published or easily obtained information on volatility in derivative and physical commodity markets, in what ways should ESMA reflect this factor in its methodology? Are there any alternative measures that may be obtained by ESMA for use in the methodology?

<ESMA_QUESTION_511>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_511>

Q512: Are there any other considerations related to the number and size of market participants that ESMA should consider in its methodology?



<ESMA_QUESTION_512>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_512>

Q513: Are there any other considerations related to the characteristics of the underlying commodity market that ESMA should consider in its methodology?

<ESMA_QUESTION_513>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_513>

Q514: For new contracts, what approach should ESMA take in establishing a regime that facilitates continued market evolution within the framework of Article 57?

<ESMA_QUESTION_514>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_514>

Q515: The interpretation of the factors in the paragraphs above will be significant in applying ESMA's methodology; do you agree with ESMA's interpretation? If you do not agree with ESMA's interpretation, what aspects require amendment?

<ESMA_QUESTION_515>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_515>

Q516: Are there any other factors which should be included in the methodology for determining position limits? If so, state in which way (with reference to the proposed methodology explained below) they should be incorporated.

<ESMA_QUESTION_516>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_516>

Q517: What do you consider to be the risks and/or the advantages of applying a different methodology for determining position limits for prompt reference contracts compared to the methodology used for the position limit on forward maturities?

<ESMA_QUESTION_517>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_517>

Q518: How should the position limits regime reflect the specific risks present in the run up to contract expiry?

<ESMA_QUESTION_518>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_518>

Q519: If a different methodology is set for the prompt reference contract, would it be appropriate to make an exception where a contract other than the prompt is the key benchmark used by the market?

<ESMA_QUESTION_519>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_519>



Q520: Do you agree that the baseline for the methodology of setting a position limit should be the deliverable supply? What concrete examples of issues do you foresee in obtaining or using the measure?

<ESMA_QUESTION_520>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_520>

Q521: If you consider that a more appropriate measure exists to form the baseline of the methodology, please explain the measure and why it is more appropriate. Consideration should be given to the reliability and availability of such a measure in order to provide certainty to market participants.

<ESMA_QUESTION_521>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_521>

Q522: Do you agree with this approach for the proposed methodology? If you do not agree, what alternative methodology do you propose, considering the full scope of the requirements of Article 57 MiFID II?

<ESMA_QUESTION_522>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_522>

Q523: Do you have any views on the level at which the baseline (if relevant, for each different asset class) should be set, and the size of the adjustment numbers for each separate factor that ESMA must consider in the methodology defined by Article 57 MiFID II?

<ESMA_QUESTION_523>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_523>

Q524: Does the approach to asset classes have the right level of granularity to take into account market characteristics? Are the key characteristics the right ones to take into account? Are the conclusions by asset class appropriate?

<ESMA_QUESTION_524>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_524>

Q525: What trading venues or jurisdictions should ESMA take into consideration in defining its position limits methodology? What particular aspects of these experiences should be included within ESMA's work?

<ESMA_QUESTION_525>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_525>

Q526: Do you agree that the RTS should accommodate the flexibility to express position limits in the units appropriate to the individual market? Are there any other alternative measures or mechanisms by which position limits could be expressed?

<ESMA_QUESTION_526>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_526>



Q527: How should the methodology for setting limits take account of a daily contract structure, where this exists?

<ESMA_QUESTION_527>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_527>

Q528: Do you agree that limits for option positions should be set on the basis of delta equivalent values? What processes should be put in place to avoid manipulation of the process?

<ESMA_QUESTION_528>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_528>

Q529: Do you agree that the preferred methodology for the calculation of delta-equivalent futures positions is the use of the delta value that is published by trading venues? If you do not, please explain what methodology you prefer, and the reasons in favour of it?

<ESMA_QUESTION_529>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_529>

Q530: Do you agree that the description of the approach outlined above, combined with the publication of limits under Article 57(9), would fulfil the requirement to be transparent and non-discriminatory?

<ESMA_QUESTION_530>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_530>

Q531: What challenges are posed by transition and what areas of guidance should be provided on implementation? What transitional arrangements would be considered to be appropriate?

<ESMA_QUESTION_531>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_531>

7.3. Position Reporting

Q532: Do you agree that, in the interest of efficient reporting, the data requirements for position reporting required by Article 58 should contain elements to enable competent authorities and ESMA to monitor effectively position limits? If you do not agree, what alternative approach do you propose for the collection of information in order to efficiently and with the minimum of duplication meet the requirements of Article 57?

<ESMA_QUESTION_532>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_532>



Q533: Do you agree with ESMA’s definition of a “position” for the purpose of Article 58? Do you agree that the same definition of position should be used for the purpose of Article 57? If you do not agree with either proposition, please provide details of a viable alternative definition.

<ESMA_QUESTION_533>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_533>

Q534: Do you agree with ESMA’s approach to the reporting of spread and other strategy trades? If you do not agree, what approach can be practically implemented for the definition and reporting of these trades?

<ESMA_QUESTION_534>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_534>

Q535: Do you agree with ESMA’s proposed approach to use reporting protocols used by other market and regulatory initiatives, in particular, those being considered for transaction reporting under MiFID II?

<ESMA_QUESTION_535>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_535>

Q536: Do you have any specific comments on the proposed identification of legal persons and/or natural persons? Do you consider there are any practical challenges to ESMA’s proposals? If yes, please explain them and propose solutions to resolve them.

<ESMA_QUESTION_536>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_536>

Q537: What are your views on these three alternative approaches for reporting the positions of an end client where there are multiple parties involved in the transaction chain? Do you have a preferred solution from the three alternatives that are described?

<ESMA_QUESTION_537>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_537>

Q538: What alternative structures or solutions are possible to meet the obligations under Article 58 to identify the positions of end clients? What are the advantages or disadvantages of these structures?

<ESMA_QUESTION_538>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_538>

Q539: Do you agree with ESMA’s proposal that only volumes traded on-exchange should be used to determine the central competent authority to which reports are made? If you do not agree, what alternative structure may be used to determine the destination of position reports?

<ESMA_QUESTION_539>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_539>



Q540: Do you agree that position reporting requirements should seek to use reporting formats from other market or regulatory initiatives? If not mentioned above, what formats and initiatives should ESMA consider?

<ESMA_QUESTION_540>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_540>

Q541: Do you agree that ESMA should require reference data from trading venues and investment firms on commodity derivatives, emission allowances, and derivatives thereof in order to increase the efficiency of trade reporting?

<ESMA_QUESTION_541>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_541>

Q542: What is your view on the use of existing elements of the market infrastructure for position reporting of both on-venue and economically equivalent OTC contracts? If you have any comments on how firms and trading venues may efficiently create a reporting infrastructure, please give details in your explanation.

<ESMA_QUESTION_542>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_542>

Q543: For what reasons may it be appropriate to require the reporting of option positions on a delta-equivalent basis? If an additional requirement to report delta-equivalent positions is established, how should the relevant delta value be determined?

<ESMA_QUESTION_543>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_543>

Q544: Does the proposed set of data fields capture all necessary information to meet the requirements of Article 58(1)(b) MiFID II? If not, do you have any proposals for amendments, deletions or additional data fields to add the list above?

<ESMA_QUESTION_544>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_544>

Q545: Are there any other fields that should be included in the Commitment of Traders Report published each week by trading venues other than those shown above?

<ESMA_QUESTION_545>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_545>



8. Market data reporting

8.1. Obligation to report transactions

Q546: Do you agree with ESMA's proposal for what constitutes a 'transaction' and 'execution of a transaction' for the purposes of Article 26 of MiFIR? If not, please provide reasons.

<ESMA_QUESTION_546>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_546>

Q547: Do you anticipate any difficulties in identifying when your investment firm has executed a transaction in accordance with the above principles?

<ESMA_QUESTION_547>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_547>

Q548: Is there any other activity that should not be reportable under Article 26 of MiFIR?

<ESMA_QUESTION_548>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_548>

Q549: Do you foresee any difficulties with the suggested approach? Please elaborate.

<ESMA_QUESTION_549>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_549>

Q550: We invite your comments on the proposed fields and population of the fields. Please provide specific references to the fields which you are discussing in your response.

<ESMA_QUESTION_550>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_550>

Q551: Do you have any comments on the designation to identify the client and the client information and details that are to be included in transaction reports?

<ESMA_QUESTION_551>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_551>

Q552: What are your views on the general approach to determining the relevant trader to be identified?

<ESMA_QUESTION_552>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_552>



Q553: In particular, do you agree with ESMA’s proposed approach to assigning a trader ID designation for committee decisions? If not, what do you think is the best way for NCAs to obtain accurate information about committee decisions?

<ESMA_QUESTION_553>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_553>

Q554: Do you have any views on how to identify the relevant trader in the cases of Direct Market Access and Sponsored Access?

<ESMA_QUESTION_554>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_554>

Q555: Do you believe that the approach outlined above is appropriate for identifying the ‘computer algorithm within the investment firm responsible for the investment decision and the execution of the transaction’? If not, what difficulties do you see with the approach and what do you believe should be an alternative approach?

<ESMA_QUESTION_555>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_555>

Q556: Do you foresee any problem with identifying the specific waiver(s) under which the trade took place in a transaction report? If so, please provide details.

<ESMA_QUESTION_556>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_556>

Q557: Do you agree with ESMA’s proposed approach to adopt a simple short sale flagging approach for transaction reports? If not, what other approaches do you believe ESMA should consider and why?

<ESMA_QUESTION_557>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_557>

Q558: Which option do you believe is most appropriate for flagging short sales? Alternatively, what other approaches do you think ESMA should consider and why?

<ESMA_QUESTION_558>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_558>

Q559: What are your views regarding the two options above?

<ESMA_QUESTION_559>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_559>

Q560: Do you agree with ESMA’s proposed approach in relation to reporting aggregated transactions? If not, what other alternative approaches do you think ESMA should consider and why?

<ESMA_QUESTION_560>



TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_560>

Q561: Are there any other particular issues or trading scenarios that ESMA should consider in light of the short selling flag?

<ESMA_QUESTION_561>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_561>

Q562: Do you agree with ESMA's proposed approach for reporting financial instruments over baskets? If not, what other approaches do you believe ESMA should consider and why?

<ESMA_QUESTION_562>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_562>

Q563: Which option is preferable for reporting financial instruments over indices? Would you have any difficulty in applying any of the three approaches, such as determining the weighting of the index or determining whether the index is the underlying in another financial instrument? Alternatively, are there any other approaches which you believe ESMA should consider?

<ESMA_QUESTION_563>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_563>

Q564: Do you think the current MiFID approach to branch reporting should be maintained?

<ESMA_QUESTION_564>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_564>

Q565: Do you anticipate any difficulties in implementing the branch reporting requirement proposed above?

<ESMA_QUESTION_565>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_565>

Q566: Is the proposed list of criteria sufficient, or should ESMA consider other/extra criteria?

<ESMA_QUESTION_566>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_566>

Q567: Which format, not limited to the ones above, do you think is most suitable for the purposes of transaction reporting under Article 26 of MiFIR? Please provide a detailed explanation including cost-benefit considerations.

<ESMA_QUESTION_567>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_567>

8.2. Obligation to supply financial instrument reference data

Q568: Do you anticipate any difficulties in providing, at least daily, a delta file which only includes updates?

<ESMA_QUESTION_568>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_568>

Q569: Do you anticipate any difficulties in providing, at least daily, a full file containing all the financial instruments?

<ESMA_QUESTION_569>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_569>

Q570: Do you anticipate any difficulties in providing a combination of delta files and full files?

<ESMA_QUESTION_570>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_570>

Q571: Do you anticipate any difficulties in providing details of financial instruments twice per day?

<ESMA_QUESTION_571>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_571>

Q572: What other aspects should ESMA consider when determining a suitable solution for the timeframes of the notifications? Please include in your response any foreseen technical limitations.

<ESMA_QUESTION_572>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_572>

Q573: Do you agree with the proposed fields? Do trading venues and investment firms have access to the specified reference data elements in order to populate the proposed fields?

<ESMA_QUESTION_573>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_573>

Q574: Are you aware of any available industry classification standards you would consider appropriate?

<ESMA_QUESTION_574>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_574>

Q575: For both MiFID and MAR (OTC) derivatives based on indexes are in scope. Therefore it could be helpful to publish a list of relevant indexes. Do you foresee any difficulties in providing reference data for indexes listed on your trading venue? Furthermore, what reference data could you provide on indexes?

<ESMA_QUESTION_575>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_575>

Q576: Do you agree with ESMA's intention to maintain the current RCA determination rules?

<ESMA_QUESTION_576>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_576>

Q577: What criteria would you consider appropriate to establish the RCA for instruments that are currently not covered by the RCA rule?

<ESMA_QUESTION_577>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_577>

<ESMA_QUESTION_1>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_1>

8.3. Obligation to maintain records of orders

Q578: In your view, which option (and, where relevant, methodology) is more appropriate for implementation? Please elaborate.

<ESMA_QUESTION_578>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_578>

Q579: In your view, what are the data elements that cannot be harmonised? Please elaborate.

<ESMA_QUESTION_579>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_579>

Q580: For those elements that would have to be harmonised under Option 2 or under Option 3, do you think industry standards/protocols could be utilised? Please elaborate.

<ESMA_QUESTION_580>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_580>

Q581: Do you foresee any difficulties with the proposed approach for the use of LEI?

<ESMA_QUESTION_581>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_581>



Q582: Do you foresee any difficulties maintaining records of the Client IDs related with the orders submitted by their members/participants? If so, please elaborate.

<ESMA_QUESTION_582>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_582>

Q583: Are there any other solutions you would consider as appropriate to track clients' order flows through member firms/participants of trading venues and to link orders and transactions coming from the same member firm/participant?

<ESMA_QUESTION_583>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_583>

Q584: Do you believe that this approach allows the order to be uniquely identified If not, please elaborate

<ESMA_QUESTION_584>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_584>

Q585: Do you foresee any difficulties with the implementation of this approach? Please elaborate

<ESMA_QUESTION_585>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_585>

Q586: Do you foresee any difficulties with the proposed approach? Please elaborate

<ESMA_QUESTION_586>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_586>

Q587: Do you foresee any difficulties with the proposed approach? Please elaborate.

<ESMA_QUESTION_587>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_587>

Q588: Would the breakdown in the two categories of order types create major issues in terms of mapping of the orders by the Trading Venues and IT developments? Please elaborate

<ESMA_QUESTION_588>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_588>

Q589: Do you foresee any problems with the proposed approach?

<ESMA_QUESTION_589>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_589>



Q590: Are the proposed validity periods relevant and complete? Should additional validity period(s) be provided? Please elaborate.

<ESMA_QUESTION_590>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_590>

Q591: Do you agree that standardised default time stamps regarding the date and time at which the order shall automatically and ultimately be removed from the order book relevantly supplements the validity period flags?

<ESMA_QUESTION_591>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_591>

Q592: Do venues use a priority number to determine execution priority or a combination of priority time stamp and sequence number?

<ESMA_QUESTION_592>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_592>

Q593: Do you foresee any difficulties with the three options described above? Please elaborate.

<ESMA_QUESTION_593>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_593>

Q594: Is the list of specific order instructions provided above relevant? Should this list be supplemented? Please elaborate.

<ESMA_QUESTION_594>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_594>

Q595: Are there any other type of events that should be considered?

<ESMA_QUESTION_595>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_595>

Q596: Do you foresee any difficulties with the proposed approach? Please elaborate.

<ESMA_QUESTION_596>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_596>

Q597: Do you foresee any problems with the proposed approach? Do you consider any other alternative in order to inform about orders placed by market makers and other liquidity providers?

<ESMA_QUESTION_597>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_597>

Q598: Do you foresee any difficulties in generating a transaction ID code that links the order with the executed transaction that stems from that order in the information that has to be kept at the disposal of the CAs? Please elaborate.

<ESMA_QUESTION_598>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_598>

Q599: Do you foresee any difficulties with maintaining this information? Please elaborate.

<ESMA_QUESTION_599>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_599>

8.4. Requirement to maintain records of orders for firms engaging in high-frequency algorithmic trading techniques (Art. 17(7) of MiFID II)³

Q600: Do you foresee any difficulties with the elements of data to be stored proposed in the above paragraph? If so, please elaborate.

<ESMA_QUESTION_600>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_600>

Q601: Do you foresee any difficulties in complying with the proposed timeframe?

<ESMA_QUESTION_601>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_601>

8.5. Synchronisation of business clocks

Q602: Would you prefer a synchronisation at a national or at a pan-European level? Please elaborate. If you would prefer synchronisation to a single source, please indicate which would be the reference clock for those purposes.

<ESMA_QUESTION_602>
Bundesverband der Wertpapierfirmen (bwf) comment:

There can be little doubt that the synchronisation of business clocks of all trading venues and their members or participants as stipulated in Article 50 MiFID II will be tremendous challenge and costly exercise for all addressees of the norm.

In this context, it must be noted that the scope of application (venues with its members and participants), does not cover all firms under MiFID II. E.g. a portfolio manager will not be required to run a synchronized business clock while his execution broker will. Accordingly, we think that the question to which

³ Please note that this section has to be read in conjunction with the section on the “Record keeping and co-operation with national competent authorities” in this DP.

extent, synchronised time stamps could be used for different purpose under MiFID II for all addressees of a particular provision, should be reassessed by ESMA.

With respect to the reference clock issue, we are of the general opinion that an existing, proven and uniform reference time should be used.

Since the majority of trading venues, according to ESMA's fact finding exercise, are already coordinated via GPS time, the feasibility of using this time standard as a common reference should be further explored, taking into account the expected cost burden associated with its implementation for firms of different size and with different business patterns.

However, as long as other time standards, e.g. UTC, can be adjusted by a precise correction factor, the selection of the physical reference clock should remain at the discretion of the individual firm, in order to avoid a costly but unnecessary redesign of the IT-infrastructure for those firms which already have implemented a sufficiently precise business clock.

<ESMA_QUESTION_602>

Q603: Do you agree with the requirement to synchronise clocks to the microsecond level?

<ESMA_QUESTION_603>

Bundesverband der Wertpapierfirmen (bwf) comment:

While we are principally in favour of a common time reference, we do not agree with ESMA's preliminary view that a synchronisation on a microsecond level would be appropriate and practicable under all circumstances. Instead, the requirement of time granularity should be calibrated with a sense of proportionality and with respect to the expected average frequency of reporting events for different types of business. Consequently, an HFT-firm with a high message volume would be required to implement a different granularity than a market participant which is solely active in screen based trading. We think that further empirical analyses should be undertaken by ESMA in order to develop classes of trading activities to which different levels of minimum granularity could be assigned.

In reverse, obliging all firms to implement synchronized clocks on a microsecond level not might result in a disproportionate cost burden for smaller firms, but it would be still highly questionable, if the desired overall accuracy from a regulatory point of view could be achieved. In this context, it must be taken into account that the theoretical achievable initial accuracy of time measurement can be degenerated by many factors in practice. To start with, the time it takes for a message/event to be entered into or to be generated by a system which is than "requesting" a time stamp, might already vary; the "reading time" of the reference clock might also be different depending on the level of hard- and software to be installed. The same holds true for the "writing time" for any reportable event as well as for any form of data transmission within a firm or between firms or between a firm and a venue.

Even though, transmission delays can be measured, anticipated and to some degree corrected by a time management protocol within a network (notably by "PTP", precision time protocol), the effort to do so will increase at progressive costs the higher the complexity of the technological environment and the lower the desired time granularity is set. Accordingly, aside from giving due attention to the aspect of economic proportionality, the inherent instability of time measurements under different circumstance necessarily needs to be taken into account when defining a meaningful and feasible regulatory framework for clock synchronization which is both, sufficiently accurate and appropriate. We have strong doubts that this could be achieved by a "one fits it all" approach.

<ESMA_QUESTION_603>

Q604: Which would be the maximum divergence that should be permitted with respect to the reference clock? How often should any divergence be corrected?

<ESMA_QUESTION_604>

Bundesverband der Wertpapierfirmen (bwf) comment:



Here, the same principles as discussed in our answer to question 603 DP should be applied. We think that different maximum differences should be assigned to different business environments in a proportionate way.

<ESMA_QUESTION_604>

9. Post-trading issues

9.1. Obligation to clear derivatives traded on regulated markets and timing of acceptance for clearing (STP)

Q605: What are your views generally on (1) the systems, procedures, arrangements supporting the flow of information to the CCP, (2) the operational process that should be in place to perform the transfer of margins, (3) the relevant parties involved these processes and the time required for each of the steps?

<ESMA_QUESTION_605>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_605>

Q606: In particular, who are currently responsible, in the ETD and OTC context, for obtaining the information required for clearing and for submitting the transaction to a CCP for clearing? Do you consider that anything should be changed in this respect? What are the current timeframes, in the ETD and OTC context, between the conclusion of the contract and the exchange of information required for clearing on one hand and on the other hand between the exchange of information and the submission of the transaction to the CPP?

<ESMA_QUESTION_606>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_606>

Q607: What are your views on the balance of these risks against the benefits of STP for the derivatives market and on the manner to mitigate such risks at the different levels of the clearing chain?

<ESMA_QUESTION_607>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_607>

Q608: When does the CM assume the responsibility of the transactions? At the time when the CCP accepts the transaction or at a different moment in time?

<ESMA_QUESTION_608>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_608>

Q609: What are your views on how practicable it would be for CM to validate the transaction before their submission to the CCP? What would the CM require for this purpose and the timeframe required? How would this validation process fit with STP?

<ESMA_QUESTION_609>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_609>

Q610: What are your views on the manner to determine the timeframe for (1) the exchange of information required for clearing, (2) the submission of a transaction to the CCP, and the constraints and requirements to consider for parties involved in both the ETD and OTC contexts?

<ESMA_QUESTION_610>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_610>

Q611: What are your views on the systems, procedures, arrangements and timeframe for (1) the submission of a transaction to the CCP and (2) the acceptance or rejection of a transaction by the CCP in view of the operational process required for a strong product validation in the context of ETD and OTC? How should it compare with the current process and timeframe? Does the current practice envisage a product validation?

<ESMA_QUESTION_611>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_611>

Q612: What should be the degree of flexibility for CM, its timeframe, and the characteristics of the systems, procedures and arrangements required to supporting that flexibility? How should it compare to the current practices and timeframe?

<ESMA_QUESTION_612>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_612>

Q613: What are your views on the treatment of rejected transactions for transactions subject to the clearing requirement and those cleared on a voluntary basis? Do you agree that the framework should be set in advance?

<ESMA_QUESTION_613>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_613>

9.2. Indirect Clearing Arrangements

Q614: Is there any reason for ESMA to adopt a different approach (1) from the one under EMIR, (2) for OTC and ETD? If so, please explain your reasons.

<ESMA_QUESTION_614>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_614>

Q615: In your view, how should it compare with current practice?

<ESMA_QUESTION_615>
TYPE YOUR TEXT HERE
<ESMA_QUESTION_615>